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Many countries face policy challenges related to the well-being of their 
aging populations, and China is no different. What distinguishes it is that 
rapid population aging is occurring in society at a significantly lower 
income level than in members of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development or, more recently, East Asian countries. 
Although the broad direction and scale of the aging transition in China 
have been known for some time, less work has been done to understand 
the household-level effects and implications for public policy. This book 
looks at the well-being of rural elderly people, a substantial and growing 
share of China’s elderly population and one that faces particular problems. 
It first provides detailed empirical analysis of the welfare and living condi-
tions of the rural elderly since the early 1990s in the context of large-scale 
rural-to-urban migration. It then goes on to explore the evolution of the 
rural pension system in China over the past two decades and to raise issues 
on that system’s current implementation and future directions.
Several findings emerge that have implications well beyond pension 
policy. First, aging is going to be faster in rural than urban areas, with the 
rural old-age dependency ratio rising by more than two and a half times 
by 2030 and the gap with urban areas widening. The book also shows that 
rural elderly people have, to date, been significantly worse off, relative 
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both to urban elderly people and to younger rural people. This finding 
occurs even though the rural elderly have longer working lives and save a 
substantial share of income across their life cycle. Rural elderly people 
remain much more dependent on their own labor and on support from 
their families than the urban elderly, who have historically had higher 
access to government pensions. 
The mass rural-to-urban migration that has happened in China since 
the 1990s is changing the context of family support to rural elderly peo-
ple. This change can be seen in the rapid shift in living arrangements in 
rural areas, where co-residence of rural elderly with their adult children 
fell from 70 percent in 1991 to 40 percent by 2006. The book documents 
the complex dynamics of migration and household behavior, with positive 
effects on elderly rural incomes from migrant remittances, but also some-
times burdensome obligations for the rural elderly to continue working 
the land into old age and to care for their “left behind” grandchildren. 
The Chinese authorities have initiated policies that seek to strengthen 
public support to rural elderly households. A national Rural Pension Pilot 
Scheme was introduced in late 2009 and has been rapidly expanded sub-
sequently, with full geographic coverage planned by end-2012. A national 
rural social assistance program (dibao) was rolled out in 2007 and now 
covers close to 50 million people, many of them from poor rural elderly 
households. The New Cooperative Medical Scheme of health insurance 
has been rapidly expanded, achieving around 95 percent coverage. It has 
been of particular value for older people in rural areas. 
The book is a collaborative effort between the Institute of Population 
and Labor Economics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the 
World Bank. It has benefited from insights from officials in the Ministry 
of Human Resources and Social Security and the Ministry of Finance, as 
well as from those of colleagues at the World Bank. The Bank hopes the 
book will not only contribute to deepening the understanding of demo-
graphic change in rural China but also highlight the substantial knowl-
edge gaps that remain. How the country manages the aging of its 
population will be one of the major challenges it faces in coming decades, 
the success of which will have implications for not only China but also 
the whole world.
Klaus Rohland
Country Director for China
World Bank, Beijing
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Executive Summary
Although average incomes in China have risen dramatically since the 
1980s, concerns are increasing that the rural elderly have not benefited 
from growth to the same extent as younger people and the urban eld-
erly. Concerns about welfare of the rural elderly combine spatial and 
demographic issues. Large gaps exist between conditions in coastal and 
interior regions and between conditions in urban and rural areas of the 
country. In addition to differences in income by geography, considera-
ble differences exist across demographic groups in the level of coverage 
by safety nets, in the benefits received through the social welfare sys-
tem, and in the risks of falling into poverty. In particular, older residents 
of rural China may be more likely to be left behind than younger 
cohorts and their urban elderly peers because of lack of pension sup-
port, insufficient savings, and migration of adult children. The China 
poverty assessment estimated that the elderly made up 8.5 percent of 
China’s poor in 2003, and that 12.8 and 13.0 percent of elderly men 
and women, respectively, lived in poverty (Chaudhuri and Datt 2009). 
It did not, however, examine separately the poverty status of rural and 
urban elderly, nor did it look in detail at the sources of support, saving 
behavior, and other issues associated with the elderly population, par-
ticularly the rural elderly.
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This book aims to do two things: first, it provides detailed empirical 
analysis of the welfare and living conditions of the rural elderly since the 
early 1990s in the context of large-scale rural-to-urban migration, and 
second, it explores the evolution of the rural pension system in China 
over the past two decades and raises a number of issues on its current 
implementation and future directions. Although the two sections of the 
book are distinct in analytical terms, they are closely linked in policy 
terms: the first section demonstrates in several ways a rationale for greater 
public intervention in the welfare of the rural elderly, and the second 
documents the response of policy to date and options to consider for 
deepening the coverage and effects of the rural pension system over the 
longer term.
The section on welfare of the rural elderly (chapters 1–4) attempts 
to answer several questions that are relevant to understanding the ratio-
nale for public support for the rural elderly.1 First, it examines demo-
graphic trends to establish the extent of aging and old-age dependency 
over time in China. It then explores the incidence of poverty and vul-
nerability among the rural elderly, both over time and relative to other 
groups of the population. After finding cause for significant concern 
related to rural elderly poverty and vulnerability, it then looks at the 
evolution of sources of support for the rural elderly to assess their rela-
tive importance and effects on household incomes. Given their impor-
tance, own-labor income and support from family are treated in more 
detail. Finally, the first section looks at saving behavior among both the 
working-age and elderly populations, across the income distribution 
and over time. The key findings with respect to rural elderly welfare are 
as follows: 
• Demographic projections for rural China made for this book and based on 
various fertility and migration scenarios suggest that the demographic tran-
sition is accelerating and that aging is far more pronounced in rural than 
in urban areas (see chapter 1). In 2008, rural and urban old-age depen-
dency ratios were 13.5 percent and 9.0 percent, respectively—a gap of 
4.5 percentage points. The gap in old-age dependency ratios will widen 
to 13.3 percentage points by 2030 when the old-age dependency ratio 
will reach 34.4 percent in rural areas and 21.1 percent in urban areas. 
With the demographic transition and continued movement of young 
adults into cities, families will be subject to further strain to support 
future generations of the rural elderly.
Executive Summary       3
• The rural elderly have been consistently poorer and more vulnerable than 
both working-age households and the urban elderly in China over time, and 
this finding includes the incidence of chronic poverty (see chapter 2). In 
addition to higher poverty rates, households headed by the rural elderly 
have been more vulnerable to poverty since the early 1990s, and the 
declines in vulnerability caused by economic growth have been less 
pronounced than for working-age households. The rural elderly 71–80 
years of age have the highest poverty rates (with a correspondingly 
slower reduction in poverty rates between the 1990s and mid-2000s), 
while those over 80 have lower poverty rates than the working-age 
population as they increasingly coreside with their adult children. 
Although location has played a reduced role as a determinant of pov-
erty in rural elderly households over time (as for all rural households), 
location remains a stronger determinant of the welfare of rural elderly 
households than of other rural households. In terms of the factors that 
affect the incomes of the rural elderly, some (such as obtaining higher 
education levels and having a pension) are positive, as expected. The 
effect of having a migrant child is, however, more complex. Although 
having a migrant child per se has an inconclusive impact on the income 
of elderly rural households, having migrant children has a clearer and 
positive impact in terms of ability to cope with shocks to household 
income, whether communitywide or household specific. As a result, 
households with migrant children are 26 percent less likely to have 
incomes below the poverty line and are far less likely to become poor 
because of health shocks.
• Sources of support for the rural elderly differ significantly from those of the 
urban elderly and also change sharply among the rural elderly during their 
sixties (see chapter 3). The rural elderly depend far more on their own 
labor and family support than the urban elderly (for whom pensions 
also play a critical role), and family support becomes more important 
as older rural populations age. This finding is true even though coresi-
dence of rural elderly with adult children has fallen from 70 percent in 
1991 to 40 percent by 2006. The rural elderly work as long as they can, 
but even then remain very dependent on family support. To understand 
both the adequacy of this support for rural elderly welfare and its likely 
responsiveness to public subsidies for old-age support, the book exam-
ines the responsiveness of private transfers by family members to low-
income households headed by elderly residents. It finds little evidence 
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that public transfers would crowd out private transfers, even at very 
low levels of income per capita. In addition, the ability of adult chil-
dren to provide private transfers may be subject to considerable 
uncertainty. The children of the rural elderly are frequently employed 
as informal sector workers in nonagricultural activities either locally 
or in migrant destinations. Given that adult children’s own incomes 
are risky, examining the variance in expected private transfers is 
important, because some variance in adult child income is likely 
passed on to parents. The book finds that low-income rural elderly 
face the risk that transfers from adult children may not be sufficient 
to keep them out of poverty.
• A considerable share of the rural elderly work well beyond age 70, though 
labor as the primary source of support falls sharply during their sixties. This 
finding is consistent with research on elderly labor supply, which pro-
vides evidence that China’s rural elderly continue to work well beyond 
age 60 out of necessity and only stop working when physically inca-
pacitated. The book also examines the effects of both adult child migra-
tion and increasing family wealth on labor-supply decisions of the 
elderly. As would be expected, rural elderly in wealthier households are 
less likely to be working, as are those with more educated household 
members and pensions. However, the effect of a migrant worker in 
itself is less clear, possibly because of the offsetting effects of higher 
income from remittances (which decrease the chances of work by the 
rural elderly) and the need to keep family land in use to retain it (which 
creates incentives for elderly family members who stay in rural loca-
tions to keep working the land).
• Saving patterns across the age distribution in China are high and remain 
positive even in old age, despite falling after 55 years of age. However, sav-
ings are strongly correlated with household income, and the rural poor are 
not saving on average (see chapter 4). The book finds that households 
without elderly members have higher saving rates, though the gap is 
narrowing, and those with migrant members have higher saving rates 
than those without (including households with elderly members). As 
might be expected, saving rates decline with age after age 55, but the 
average saving rate always remains positive, even into advanced old age. 
Little comparable decline occurs in saving rates in elderly households 
with migrants, which likely reflects the perceived transitory nature of 
remittance income. The difference in saving behaviors between rural 
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households with and without social security benefits is significant and 
consistent over time, which is further verified when findings are broken 
down by income quintile group.
The analysis in chapters 1–4 provides the rationale for public sector 
intervention in rural old-age welfare, and the Chinese authorities are 
committed to rapidly expanding coverage of the rural pension under the 
national pilot scheme launched in 2009. Given the directions of national 
policy, the second section of the book (chapters 5 and 6) looks at China’s 
experience with pensions for the rural elderly and the lessons of experi-
ence since the 1990s, including observations on the initial implementa-
tion of the national rural pension pilot. Chapter 6 discusses key issues for 
the rural pension system in the longer term, and raises a number of 
options for consideration in the evolution of the system that may help it 
achieve the government’s policy objectives even more effectively over 
time. It also reviews relevant international experience in both matching 
defined contribution schemes and social pensions.
The experience with rural pensions in China during the 1990s and 
2000s has been piecemeal but provides a number of important lessons 
that have informed design of the new national scheme. Prior experience 
with rural pensions (including the wave of local pilots since the early 
2000s) suggests that several issues need close attention in the funded 
portion of the rural pension system, including the following: (a) the 
regulation and oversight of funded portions of rural pensions, which 
have been—and in many areas remain—significantly underdeveloped; 
(b) the need for a public subsidy to incentivize sustained participation 
of rural workers, and issues of the balance of public subsidy among 
levels of government, the individual, and the collective economy; (c) 
the relatively low retirement ages (often 60 or below) that are under-
standable given the current ages in the urban system and have been 
retained in the national pilot, but will be important to raise to reflect 
the rapidly changing demographics of rural areas; (d) the interaction of 
pension benefits with the consolidating rural social assistance system to 
ensure policy coherence across the social protection system; (e) the 
challenges of the portfolio investment rules on funded pensions leading 
to very low rates of return; (f) the very localized management of pen-
sion accumulations, presenting challenges of weak local capacity and 
failure to exploit economies of scale; and (g) the portability rules and 
implementing mechanisms between the rural pension system and the 
urban systems.
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The national pension pilot is an exciting and positive development in 
terms of expanding pension coverage to the rural population. Moreover, 
some adaptations of the national rural pension pilot have the potential to 
increase the strengths of the system over time. Chapter 6 gives options 
that the government could consider as it expands the current schemes for 
rural workers (and parallel schemes for urban residents) over time. The 
chapter also lays out relevant international experience.2 The following 
key issues are addressed:
• Inclusion of a matching defined contribution element in the national pilot 
and the appropriate level of the matching subsidy and its functions relative 
to the basic pension benefit in terms of incentives to participate in the scheme. 
Although a single “correct” level of matching subsidy is difficult to 
define, emerging international experience suggests that considering a 
stronger role for the matching subsidy as the system evolves could have 
merit.
• Rules for investment and management of individual account contributions, 
and options for reducing the challenges of low rates of return that have been 
seen in the urban funded system. The chapter makes a number of sugges-
tions for consideration as the system evolves. The first is the desirability 
of some guaranteed rate of return on individual account accumulations, 
preferably national gross domestic product. The second is that the 
introduction of a reserve fund to address fluctuations in returns on 
individual accounts or the exhaustion of benefits caused by longevity 
may be worth considering. Third, the authorities might consider using 
age-based portfolio default rules that provide for more aggressive 
investment for younger contributors that gradually becomes more con-
servative over the life cycle to focus on preserving the value of accumu-
lations at retirement. A fourth issue is whether in the medium term 
permitting account holders to borrow a portion of their account accu-
mulations at a specified interest rate and with legally binding repay-
ment conditions is desirable for the individual account. Finally, the 
management of funds in individual accounts and the appropriate level 
of the system for doing this merit consideration. Current pilot schemes 
and past practice have generally involved management at the county 
level. However, clear benefits exist to combining funds from localities 
into a single pot of money that can be managed at higher levels to gen-
erate economies of scale in fund management. Previous experience 
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with rural pensions in China cautions against localized management 
and investment of accumulations.
• Whether the basic pension benefit in the national pilot should in time 
evolve into a “social pension” in which coverage is not dependent on 
contributions. International experience reviewed later in this section 
suggests that achieving full pension coverage is very difficult at the 
level of the individual in rural and informal sector schemes based on 
approaches that require contributions, even when incentives are 
provided to contribute. A social pension approach—as used in all 
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment and in a growing number of developing countries—would 
be broadly consistent with the design of the basic benefit provision 
under the rural pension pilot, and this book believes it is worthy of 
serious consideration as the rural pension system evolves (as well as 
having potential relevance for emerging “urban resident” schemes). 
Any social pension should be subjected to a pension test that would 
adjust the amount paid to those ages 65 to 74 by a proportion of 
benefits they receive either from an individual account or from an 
urban workers’ pension.
• Transition and portability issues. These will become important as the 
national rural pension scheme matures. The first type of transition is 
from old to new rural pension schemes within the same locality. Prac-
tice in China has varied, with areas such as Beijing allowing portability 
of funded accumulations from old to new schemes, whereas other areas, 
such as the province of Hunan, stipulate that participants must close 
out their accounts in old schemes before starting afresh in new pilots. 
The national scheme appears to allow transfers of balances from prior 
schemes. The second (and ultimately more important) issue is portabil-
ity between rural and urban schemes (or migrant-worker schemes 
located in urban areas where these exist). This issue will be critical to 
reaching the government’s stated goal of an integrated social security 
system by 2020. The ease with which this transfer can be done has 
varied according to scheme design and the compatibility of rural pilots 
with existing urban schemes. In principle, in all schemes, the funded 
portion is easily made portable. Because the matching defined contri-
bution design adopted in the national rural pilot has no social pooling, 
no issues of apportionment arise. 
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The issue of portability raises a host of design and implementation 
questions that will need to be closely considered during the pilot phase 
of the rural pension pilot. When a worker moves, will the funds in his or 
her account move, or will only his or her contribution records do so? How 
will the system account for accumulations in the rural system when 
workers move to the urban system? Finally, are pensions paid from vari-
ous locations or from a single payment authority? These questions raise 
issues for record keeping, communication and information exchange 
between systems, and the exchange of account information. In principle, 
such questions should be capable of being addressed by standardized 
record-keeping and reporting formats for the new rural pension system 
being disseminated by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security. Harmonization of fund transfer and pension disbursement pro-
cedures would also be required. Again, some degree of centralization 
would be desirable to lessen administrative demands at the lower levels, 
although this might be at the provincial level within national guidelines. 
Elaborated guidance from the central authorities on these issues will be 
necessary over time.
• Interaction between the funded portion of the rural pension system and 
the basic benefit in the longer term. A key policy decision relates to 
whether individual accounts and the basic benefit (or social pension) 
should be combined over time as the contributory system matures. 
The two broad options are (a) to retain a basic benefit/social pension 
for persons over a certain age to provide an income floor that is sup-
plemented by benefits from individual accounts, or (b) to gradually 
phase out the basic benefit/social pension as the contributory system 
matures, addressing elderly poverty through the regular social assis-
tance program (perhaps, as is the case in a number of urban areas 
already, with an elderly supplement on the dibao threshold or benefit 
level). This book recommends that the basic benefit/social pension 
should be retained even in the longer run and cites the case of Chile 
as an instructive model of the interaction of social pensions and indi-
vidual accounts that strikes a sensible balance between poverty and 
incentive concerns.
• Future integration between urban and rural pension systems and the issue 
of portability. Although “integration” is unlikely in the foreseeable future 
to imply full equalization of benefits between rural and urban areas, a 
common design framework would be useful to facilitate portability 
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between systems. This can already be seen in several areas, where inte-
grated pension schemes for rural and urban residents are in place (for 
example, Zhongshan in Guangdong Province).
Notes
 1. The first section is drawn from the background paper by Cai, Giles, and Wang 
(2009), which uses a rich variety of data sources to examine various dimen-
sions of rural elderly welfare. 
 2. This chapter is an adapted and shortened form of the annex on rural pensions 
in the forthcoming Pensions Framework Paper (World Bank forthcoming). 
That paper covers all elements of the Chinese pension system in a more com-
prehensive manner, and consultations on the draft were carried out in 2010. 
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C H A P T E R  1
Trends in the Aging of China’s 
Rural Population: Past, Present, 
and Future
China’s rapid demographic transition has led to the shrinking of the 
working-age share of the population and has raised concerns about 
population aging. Concerns have arisen over the old-age support and 
social security system in both rural and urban areas, as have worries 
about potential labor supply and labor market shortages in the future 
and the appropriateness of fertility and family-planning policies. This 
chapter reviews China’s demographic transition, with a particular 
focus on rural areas and on aging and fertility. Results are based on new 
estimates from a team comprising the China Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS), China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), and the 
World Bank. These estimates emphasize the importance of under-
standing the effects of migration on population structure and distribu-
tion. Not only will old-age dependency ratios rise rapidly, but this 
trend is likely to be much more pronounced in rural areas (consistent 
with anecdotal concerns about the “hollowing out” of villages because 
of migration). Such changes are likely to put additional strains on 
informal support networks, which are already unable to provide full 
support to their elderly members.1
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Demographic Transition in China
In the planned-economy period, fertility was high in most years, except 
for the period between 1958 and 1961. As shown in figure 1.1, the aver-
age birthrate was more than 3.06 percent during the prereform period 
but witnessed a sharp decline after the mid-1970s with implementation 
of China’s family planning policy. The death rate had dropped earlier to 
below 1.00 percent after the introduction of a rural cooperative medical 
system in the early 1960s and has held at roughly 0.65 percent since the 
beginning of the reform period. A declining birthrate with a low and 
stable death rate is a feature of China’s low-fertility era.
From 1978 to 2008, China’s annual population growth rate dropped 
from 1.20 to 0.51 percent. The tremendous decline can be attributed to 
two sources: the implementation of family planning policies and the 
effect of economic reforms (Gu and others 2007; Johnson 1994; Schultz 
and Yi 1999; Vermeer 2006). One-child policies were first implemented 
in cities and then extended to the countryside, leading to an abrupt 
decline in total fertility during the late 1970s. As figure 1.2 shows, the 
sharp drop contrasts with changes in fertility in other developing coun-
tries during the 1970s. Since 1990, China’s total fertility rate (TFR) has 
approached that of developed countries. Another important factor in 
recent years has been rural-to-urban migration. Increasing nonagricultural 
employment opportunities have caused rural migrants to postpone mar-
riage and thus delay fertility. 
Over the past 40 years, China has experienced the demographic tran-
sition to an “aging society” that typically took more than 100 years in 
such developed countries as the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
the Nordic countries (Uhlenberg 2009). Similarly, most of these devel-
oped countries had rural pension systems in place long before popula-
tions started to age (see box 1.1). By international standards, a society is 
said to be aging when (a) more than 10 percent of the population is over 
60 years of age, and (b) more than 7 percent is over 65. As shown in 
figure 1.3, China entered the ranks of aging societies in 2000, when the 
over-60 and over-65 shares of the population reached 10.5 percent and 
7.0 percent, respectively.
Population aging has been uneven between rural and urban areas dur-
ing China’s demographic transition, with rural areas aging more rapidly. 
Even though fertility is higher in rural areas than in urban areas, the 
elderly proportion of the rural population is also higher. As shown in 
figure 1.4, the gap of aged population between rural and urban areas has 
Figure 1.1 Population Growth in China, 1949–2008
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Figure 1.2 International Comparison of TFRs, 1950–2010
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been widening. In 1982, the proportion of the population 60 and older 
was 7.8 percent in rural and 7.1 percent in urban areas but rose to 13.7 
percent and 12.1 percent, respectively, by 2005. The difference in the 
proportions of the population 65 and older between rural and urban areas 
has shown a similar trend over time. 
Because rural migrants to urban areas tend to be younger than rural 
residents remaining behind, the increase in the elderly share of the 
rural population is driven by rural-to-urban migration. Latest esti-
mates show 225.4 million rural migrants in 2008, with 62.4 percent 
living outside their home townships (NBS 2009), and the 2006 agri-
cultural census found that 82.1 percent of rural migrants are younger 
than 40. The increase in rural-to-urban migration, especially the out-
flow of the rural young population, has caused acute changes in rural 
population pyramids in the reform era. As shown in figure 1.5, the 
rural population pyramid in 1982 had a larger population base, but it 
has narrowed significantly since then, showing a larger proportion of 
elderly by 2005. 
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Box 1.1
International Experiences on Aging and Pension Systems: 
How Does China Compare?
Compared with developed countries, China still has a low old-age dependency 
ratio, but it has risen quickly in recent years. The projected growth in the old-age 
dependency ratios in rural areas of China by 2030 resembles that of Japan in the 
past 30 years. Of the countries shown in the accompanying figure, all had com-
prehensive rural pension systems in place at an earlier stage of population aging 
than did China. In terms of social security, Denmark was the first country in the 
world to establish a rural pension system, in 1891. The United Kingdom started to 
provide pensions for rural people in 1946, and the United States in 1936. In Asia, 
Japan and the Republic of Korea established their rural pension systems in 1971 
and 1990, respectively. The experience of developed countries suggests that 
preparation for aging societies includes support for the rural elderly in the process 
of socioeconomic transformation.
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The old-age dependency ratio has also been consistently higher in 
rural areas because of rapid population aging. Figure 1.6 compares old-
age dependency ratios in rural and urban areas. In 1982, rural and urban 
old-age dependency ratios were 8.4 percent and 6.6 percent, respectively. 
In 2005, they were 13.9 percent and 11.8 percent, respectively. 
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Figure 1.3 Trend of Population Aging in China, 1953–2005
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Figure 1.4 Comparison of Aged Population Proportions in Rural and Urban Areas
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Figure 1.5 Changes in Rural Population Pyramids between 1982 and 2005
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Figure 1.6 Comparison of Rural and Urban Old-Age Dependency Ratios
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Looking Ahead—Projecting Population Trends
Although different assumptions lead to variations in the projected rate 
of change, China’s demographic trends will continue, with an accelera-
tion of population aging in coming years. Figure 1.5 shows the rapid 
historical transition in the composition of China’s rural elderly popula-
tion from the early 1980s to the mid-2000s. On the basis of projections 
completed for this report and shown in figure 1.7, this trend will con-
tinue steadily until 2030 and beyond, when the population now in their 
thirties and forties reaches pensionable age. The overall projected 
population structure is based on key variables that are discussed in the 
following paragraphs.
The true TFR in China has been the cause of considerable debate 
(Guo 2004, 2008; Retherford and others 2005). The annual popula-
tion survey results show that TFRs have declined from 2.25 in 1990 to 
1.45 in 2007 (figure 1.8), but these results are thought to be underes-
timates caused by unreported children and biased sampling. After 
using data from the population census and population sample to cor-
rect these estimates, the adjusted TFR is higher, at 1.57 in 2007 and 
close to the assumed low-fertility-rate scenario introduced below (see 
box 1.2 for details). 
Figure 1.7 Changes in Rural Population Pyramids between 2020 and 2030
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Box 1.2
Representative Population Projections in China
Several representative population projections have been developed to predict 
trends of China’s total population. The following organizations have made differ-
ent projections: the United Nations Population Division, China’s Population and 
Family Planning Commission, Peking University, and a joint team from the Insti-
tute of Population and Labor Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sci-
ences (CASS-IPLE), NBS, and the World Bank (CASS-IPLE/NBS/WB). Key parameters 
in population projections made by the CASS-IPLE/NBS/WB team include TFRs, life 
expectancy, and urbanization. Different assumptions behind these parameters 
produce different trends for China’s total population, but these assumptions were 
made to serve different objectives, and the different population projections have 
their individual strengths and weaknesses.
The United Nations Population Division focuses on global population trends 
by projecting the trend of each country at the national level. It updates its pop-
ulation projection annually. The latest projection can be obtained from the
(continued next page)
Figure 1.8 Surveyed and Adjusted TFRs in China
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2010 revision of its population database. Total fertility rates for China have four 
variants: 1.31 (low), 1.56 (medium), 1.81 (high), and 1.64 (constant) at the starting 
point. Its life expectancy assumption of 84.2 years is the same in 2100 across dif-
ferent scenarios. It does not assume differences in TFRs between rural and urban 
areas or take into account migration and urbanization. 
China’s Population and Family Planning Commission has made population 
projections similar to those of the United Nations. The projection is also based on 
the national level with different variants of TFRs. 
The population projection of Peking University is unique. It adopts “progres-
sive total fertility rates” instead of TFRs to make population projections. This meth-
od takes into account the differences in behavior of women who have given birth 
and those who have not. It also takes account of urbanization trends by using 
statistics on agricultural and nonagricultural population and assumes that the 
nonagricultural proportion of the population would be 42.9 percent in 2030 and 
55.00 percent in 2050—assumptions that are obviously very low.
The joint CASS/NBS/WB population projection used in this report has the fol-
lowing features: 
• It uses the 2000 population census and 2005 1 percent population sample to 
adjust TFRs in both rural and urban areas.
• It uses the classification of rural and urban areas in the 2000 population census 
and the 2005 population sample and makes the corresponding population 
projections.
• It uses two TFR scenarios: low (1.60 overall, based on 1.70 for the rural popula-
tion and 1.33 for urban population) and high (1.80 overall, with rural of 2.35, 
urban of 1.36). For the projections presented in this chapter, the low fertility rate 
is used unless otherwise indicated, because it appears to be closest to what is 
observed from the census.
• Three levels of urbanization appear by 2030: low (55 percent), medium 
(60 percent), and high (65 percent). For the projections in this chapter, the 
medium urbanization rate is used unless otherwise indicated. 
• Life expectancy is assumed to be the same as in the United Nations popula-
tion projection.
Source: Cai, Giles, and Wang 2009.
Box 1.2 (continued)
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If one uses the combination of low fertility rate and medium urbaniza-
tion level, China’s total population will continue an upward trend, but 
with a decreasing growth rate, peaking in 2030 at 1.41 billion. The num-
ber of working-age people will decline after 2016, earlier than the growth 
of total population, which will lead to a decreasing working-age to 
elderly support ratio. Changes in support ratios differ in rural and urban 
areas. The proportion of working-age people in rural areas will drop from 
69.0 percent in 2008 to 63.5 percent in 2030, while the urban working-
age share will decrease from 77.2 percent to 70.0 percent during the 
same period (figure 1.9). In the process of urbanization, migration of 
young people into cities will shift the distribution of the working-age 
population further from rural to urban areas. Among the total working-
age population, rural people accounted for 51.6 percent in 2008, but that 
percentage will drop to 37.7 percent in 2030 under reasonable rural-to-
urban migration assumptions.
Even with higher TFRs in rural areas, migration implies that popula-
tion aging will occur more rapidly in rural areas. In 2008, 9.35 percent 
of the population was 65 years of age and older in rural areas and 6.94 
percent in urban areas, a gap of 2.41 percentage points. By 2030, the 
aged proportions in rural and urban areas will be 21.84 percent and 
14.75 percent, respectively, increasing the gap to 7.09 percentage points 
(figure 1.10). As more young people move to and choose to stay in 
Figure 1.9 Trends of Working-Age Population in China, 2008–30
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 cities, finding favorable conditions in rural areas to support the rural 
elderly poses a major challenge to China’s rural and socioeconomic 
transformation.
The acceleration of population aging will raise the support burden of 
the working-age population, though this effect will be masked somewhat 
in the medium term by a decline in the child dependency ratio in rural 
areas. The total dependency ratios in rural areas appear stable between 
2008 and 2025 (figure 1.11) because the rural child dependency ratio 
will fall significantly while the pace of population aging increases. The 
child dependency ratios will converge between rural and urban areas in 
2025 and then remain stable. The child dependency ratio in urban areas 
will keep increasing, but at a slower pace. 
Old-age dependency ratios will diverge between rural and urban 
areas (figure 1.12). In 2008, rural and urban ratios were 13.5 percent 
and 9.0 percent, respectively, and the gap was 4.5 percentage points. 
The gap in old-age dependency ratios will widen to 13.3 percentage 
points by 2030, when the old-age dependency ratio will reach 34.4 per-
cent in rural areas and 21.1 percent in urban areas.
Although different assumed scenarios for urbanization and fertility 
yield somewhat differing results, the fundamental demographic trends 
remain similar. Figure 1.13 reports the elderly shares of the rural popula-
tion under four combinations of TFRs and 2030 urbanization levels to 
test the robustness of the conclusions under the “base case” scenario used 
Figure 1.10 Trends of Population Aging in Rural and Urban China, 2008–30
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Figure 1.11 Trends of Total Dependency Ratios in Rural and Urban China, 2008–30
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Figure 1.12 Old-Age Dependency Ratios in Rural and Urban China, 2008–30
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in this report of low TFR and medium urbanization. The four combina-
tions are as follows: 
• High TFR and high urbanization level
• High TFR and low urbanization level
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Figure 1.13 Scenarios of Aged Proportions in Rural China, 2008–30
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Note: HFHU = high TFR, high urbanization level; HFLU = high TFR, low urbanization level; LFHU = low TFR, high 
urbanization level; LFLU = low TFR, low urbanization level. 
• Low TFR and high urbanization level
• Low TFR and low urbanization level
The trends from the preceding four combinations are similar, but the 
elderly proportions of rural population differ significantly under each 
scenario by 2030.
As shown in figure 1.13, the largest aged proportion occurs under a 
scenario of low TFR and high urbanization level by 2030. As discussed 
before, migration will attract more young people into cities. In the 
meantime, the low TFR will accelerate the speed of population aging. 
Therefore, these two forces will influence population aging in rural 
areas. In contrast, the smallest aged proportion would occur in the sce-
nario with high TFR and low urbanization. With more young people 
staying in rural areas, the aged proportion would be lower. In 2030, the 
difference in the aged proportion between these two scenarios is 3.9 
percentage points. Urbanization will likely accelerate in the coming 
years. The scenario of low TFR and high urbanization is therefore per-
fectly possible and would result in the most acute dependency ratio in 
rural areas (figure 1.14).
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Conclusion
As the demographic transition outlined in this chapter takes place, fami-
lies will suffer further strain to support future generations of the rural 
elderly when young adults move into cities and family size becomes 
smaller, with fewer potential care providers. The population projections 
in this chapter use different fertility and migration scenarios to illustrate 
the acceleration of the demographic transition; they show that aging will 
remain far more pronounced in rural than urban areas. Although fertility 
is higher in rural areas than in urban areas, the large-scale migration of the 
young population will hollow out villages and leave behind older people, 
women, and children. At the national level, the old-age dependency ratio 
will pass 20 percent and continue to rise even faster to 30 percent around 
2028. The levels of old-age dependency will be significantly higher in 
rural areas, and the gap in dependency rates between rural and urban 
areas will widen. 
The trends of population aging in rural areas raise many questions 
about the potential for future elderly to support themselves and the 
possibility that they may fall into poverty. To address these questions, 
Figure 1.14 Scenarios of Old-Age Dependency Ratios in Rural China, 2008–30
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the current determinants of poverty and sources of formal and informal 
support among the elderly are examined, including the following: How 
much poverty and vulnerability are observed presently among the rural 
elderly, and is this situation changing over time? What kinds of formal 
and informal social protection methods are available for rural house-
holds to cope with (and forestall) poverty among the rural elderly? 
What effects has the mass migration of recent years had on the efficacy 
of informal social protection mechanisms? In light of the evidence, does 
public policy have a role to support the rural aged population? The fol-
lowing chapters address these questions.
Note
 1. See World Bank (forthcoming) for discussion of other strains on traditional 
support networks and chapters 3 and 4 of this report for sources of support 
and savings for the rural elderly.
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C H A P T E R  2
Poverty and Vulnerability among 
China’s Rural Elderly
This chapter looks at poverty and vulnerability among the rural elderly in 
China during the past decade. Key findings include the following:
• The rural elderly are on average poorer than the general population and 
substantially poorer than the urban elderly. 
• They are also more likely to remain poor and are more vulnerable than 
the younger population.
• Location matters more as a determinant of poverty for the rural elderly 
than for working-age adults, though its importance has declined over 
time. 
• In terms of factors that affect incomes of the rural elderly, those 
who have more education or a pension are likely to have higher 
incomes. The effect of having a migrant child is, however, more 
 complex. Although having a migrant child has an inconclusive effect 
on the income of elderly rural households, having migrant children 
has a clearer and positive effect in terms of ability to cope with 
shocks to household income, whether communitywide or house-
hold specific. 
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Poverty among the Rural Elderly
As a group, the rural elderly remain notably poorer than younger rural 
households, even though their poverty rates have fallen over recent 
decades. Figure 2.1 highlights this situation by showing the evolution of 
the rural poverty head-count ratio by age of household head from 1991 to 
2004.1 Income poverty has fallen for all age groups in rural China, but 
notably, households headed by older individuals have a higher incidence of 
poverty than households with working-age heads for each year. By 2004, 
the income poverty rate for rural households with working-age heads was 
only 8.5 percent, whereas it was 15.0 percent for households with a head 
age 71 to 80 years and 17.0 percent for households with a head over 80 
years of age. This pattern occurs because younger working-age adults with 
higher education are more likely to take advantage of opportunities from 
economic growth. 
The rural elderly have also remained consistently poorer than the 
urban elderly over time. Using the China Urban and Rural Elderly Survey 
(CURES) conducted in 2006, table 2.1 provides a comparison of poverty 
among the elderly in urban and rural areas. Poverty among the elderly is 
a much greater problem in rural than in urban areas. The CURES (2006),2 
which is a nationally representative sample, suggests that 19 percent of 
rural elderly have consumption levels below the official poverty line, 
whereas only 6 percent of the urban elderly are below the higher “basic 
needs line.” The comparable share of elderly with consumption below the 
basic needs line in rural areas is 29 percent. The poverty gap measure, 
which measures the depth of households below the poverty line, also 
suggests a more severe problem in rural areas than in urban areas. Finally, 
the poverty severity measure picks up the effects of inequality among the 
poor and suggests that severe poverty is also a more serious problem in 
rural than urban areas.3 Given the access of the urban elderly to pension 
income as well as family support, it is not surprising that poverty is much 
higher among the rural elderly. 
Chronic Poverty among the Rural Elderly
Chronic, or persistent, poverty is also a problem faced more by older rural 
households. The chronically poor can be defined as those households that 
are poor on three successive survey rounds. Households headed by elderly 
individuals in their seventies remain the most exposed to chronic poverty. 
Although incidence of chronic income poverty fell in the China Health 
Figure 2.1 Percentage of Poor Rural Households, by Age of Household Head
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Table 2.1 Measuring the Poverty of the Rural and Urban Elderly 
share of population under line
Income poverty Consumption poverty
Head-count 
index
Poverty 
gap
Poverty 
severity
Head-count 
index
Poverty 
gap
Poverty 
severity
Rural elderly
Official poverty 
line 0.196 0.083 0.044 0.192 0.075 0.040 
Basic needs line 0.287 0.127 0.073 0.287 0.118 0.067 
One-dollar-
a-day line 0.303 0.131 0.076 0.292 0.123 0.070 
Urban elderly
Basic needs line 0.054 0.020 0.013 0.058 0.027 0.018 
One-dollar-
a-day line 0.034 0.017 0.012 0.055 0.025 0.016 
Source: Cai, Giles, and Park 2009, estimated using data from CURES 2006.
and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) to nearly zero for cohorts under 70 years 
of age, nearly 22 percent of elderly in their seventies as of 2000 experi-
enced persistent poverty over three survey rounds spanning a seven-year 
period (figure 2.2). 
Why do rural elderly in their seventies face a greater incidence of per-
sistent income poverty? Younger elderly in their sixties continue to earn 
considerable income from work in agriculture, but the ability to continue 
agricultural work degrades with age, and the elderly lack significant 
sources of income other than support from adult children. Those elderly 
surviving into their eighties are a select group. In rural areas, they typically 
reside with adult children, who have higher incomes.
Vulnerability to Poverty
Vulnerability to poverty over time is considerably higher than actual 
poverty at any one point in time. Following an approach used in the 
World Bank’s China poverty assessment (Chaudhuri and Datt 2009), 
this book determines a household to be vulnerable to poverty if it is 
poor in one of three survey years over a six-year period. Figure 2.3 
shows the share of the rural population vulnerable to poverty during 
early and late periods of the CHNS panel (1991 to 1997, and 1997 to 
2004).4 Because rural incomes are quite variable, the probability that a 
household experiences negative shocks and incomes below the poverty 
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line in one year of a six-year period will be higher than annual income 
poverty rates.5 
Rural households with older heads are more vulnerable to poverty, 
and declines in vulnerability between 1991 and 2004 have been more 
pronounced for households headed by working-age individuals and 
least pronounced for households headed by individuals in their seven-
ties. Nearly 63 percent of households headed by an individual in his or 
her seventies in 2000 experienced income below the basic needs line 
in 1997, 2000, or 2004. This occurred for fewer than 40 percent of 
working-age adults and only 45 percent of households headed by 
Figure 2.2 Share of Rural Elderly Households Experiencing Chronic Poverty
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Figure 2.3 Share of Rural Elderly Households Vulnerable to Poverty
a. 1991–97
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 period and in 2000 for the 1997–2004 period.
someone in their sixties. Vulnerability was also fairly low among house-
holds with heads in their eighties, probably because rural residents in 
their eighties nearly always coreside with younger family members. 
“Head of household” in these cases more likely reflects ownership of 
the dwelling and not primary income earner status in the household.
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The Geographic Dimension of Poverty
The importance of location as a determinant of poverty has declined for 
all households since the 1990s, but the decline is higher in absolute terms 
for households headed by elderly people. Early in the reform era, spatial 
differences in incomes and poverty incidence were largely driven by 
restrictions on migration reinforced by differences in per capita land 
endowments, access to urban markets, and level of local development. 
With China’s economic reform, the importance of geography has declined 
in explaining poverty and inequality (Benjamin, Brandt, and Giles 2005), 
while inequality within communities was increasing at an even faster rate 
as individuals differed in their ability to take advantage of wider off-farm 
labor markets with migration. Young adult migrants may provide support 
to elderly parents through remittances, so one might observe that geogra-
phy becomes less important for explaining inequality and poverty among 
the elderly. In table 2.2, results show a decline in the share of variance in 
income that can be explained by village location from 1993 to 2000, with 
a slight increase after 2004 for all households and for households with 
elderly, respectively.6 The degree to which location explains variation in 
poverty status declined from 26 percent in 1991 to 12 percent in 2004. 
The decline in importance of location in explaining poverty reflects the 
importance of increasing market integration as a means of raising incomes 
for households in villages that were previously isolated.
When one looks at households with elderly residents, location obvi-
ously was more important in earlier years for explaining both volatility 
of income and poverty status. Also, the importance of location in deter-
mining poverty status among the elderly declined even more sharply, 
from 40 percent to 20 percent, between 1993 and 2004. This finding 
suggests that even if the rural elderly are unable to directly benefit from 
Table 2.2 Role of Village Location in Determining Poverty of China’s Rural Elderly
share of variance explained by village location 
Dependent variable 
to decompose 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004
All households
ln(income per capita) 0.279 0.301 0.264 0.258 0.262
Poverty 0.256 0.263 0.213 0.147 0.124
Households with elderly
ln(income per capita) 0.381 0.421 0.381 0.355 0.301
Poverty 0.358 0.400 0.301 0.242 0.200
Source: Cai, Giles, and Wang 2009, estimated using CHNS 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, and 2004.
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employment in distant markets, they enjoy some spillover benefits as 
family members remit incomes earned as migrant workers. 
Nonetheless, location remains a stronger determinant of welfare among 
the rural elderly than among all rural households. The fact that 20 
percent of the variation in elderly poverty status can be explained by 
village location as late as 2004 suggests that, relative to working-age 
adults, elderly persons remaining in home villages are less likely to have 
benefited from the increase in opportunities resulting from China’s 
economic reforms.7 
Income Determinants of the Elderly
Apart from geography, the incomes of the elderly may vary with common 
shocks experienced by the community, with their own health status or 
the health status of other household residents, and with the migration 
status of adult children. Indeed, a growing literature on migration in 
China shows how migration has contributed to raising the incomes of 
rural households and facilitated smoothing the effects of shocks to 
income.8 The rural elderly may not benefit from increases in rural-to-
urban migration if the elderly are members of poorer households that are 
less involved in migrant employment or if migrant children are not remit-
ting a share of their income. 
The results in table 2.3 highlight the effects of three policy variables 
on household income per capita: human capital (the average education of 
adult household members), formal social support (whether a family 
member receives a pension), and migration (whether the adult child of 
the household from a previous round is now working elsewhere as a 
migrant). The main findings in this regard follow. 
• Increasing the average education of adult members of elderly households by 
one year is associated with a 7.6 percent increase in income per capita. 
Thus, higher human capital among adults in a household may improve 
not only the well-being of working-age adults but also the well-being 
of their elderly parents. 
• Receipt of a pension is associated with 67 percent higher household income 
per capita. In observing the correlation between pension receipt and 
household income, however, one must remember that few households 
in rural areas received pensions at the time of the surveys and that 
receipt of a pension was likely to be correlated with other household 
characteristics that lead to higher incomes (for example, high human 
capital, prior military service, or experience as a village cadre). 
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• The effect of having a migrant family member suggests a 5.7 percent 
increase in income, but this effect is statistically insignificant. This result 
is somewhat surprising, so one must examine further whether having 
a migrant family member is significant at times of communitywide 
shocks.
Although the effect of having a migrant household member on house-
hold income is inconclusive, a migrant child provides insurance against 
loss of income stemming from shocks to the local economy. As shown in 
table 2.3, the coefficient for the interaction between the occurrence of a 
community income shock and having a migrant adult child in the house-
hold is significantly negative, indicating that having a migrant child can 
mitigate the effects of a communitywide shock. 
Another major source of shock to incomes comes from illness, either 
to oneself or to another elderly member of the household. Health status 
can be captured using objective measures, such as activities of daily living 
or body mass index, but a stronger indication of the likelihood that a 
Table 2.3 Factors Affecting Income per Capita of Households with Elderly
dependent variable: ln(hh income per capita)
Model 1 2
Average years of education of adult household members  0.076*** 0.076***
(0.007) (0.009)
Has family members with pension income 0.692*** 0.671***
(0.037) (0.043)
Has migrant family members 0.057 0.061
(0.060) (0.073)
Community income shock 0.156***
(0.028)
(Community income shock)* (Migrant family members) −0.126**
(0.064)
Elder died in the following year −0.374***
(0.094)
(Elder died following year)* (Migrant family members) 1.008***
(0.376)
R-squared 0.203 0.190
Number of observations 5,060 3,708
Source: Cai, Giles, and Wang 2009, estimated using CHNS 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, and 2006.
Note: Migrant family member = a member of the household from a previous round is no longer a household 
member and is currently working as a migrant.
Community income shock = change in log income per capita for all other households in the enumeration area.
All models also include years of education, age, age-squared, lives with spouse, lives with adult children, number 
of adult household members, year dummy variables, and enumeration area dummy variables. The model num-
ber shown above corresponds to the model number in the expanded set of results.
Standard errors of model coefficients are shown in parentheses.
*, **, and *** indicate significance of 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
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household member has been incapacitated is subsequent mortality. 
Typically, individuals who die experience periods of incapacitation a year 
or two before passing away. This analysis therefore uses death of a house-
hold member one year following a survey round as a proxy for the pres-
ence of a family member who is too ill to work and examines the impact 
on household income.9 
The effects of ill health of the elderly on household income are sub-
stantial but are more than compensated for where households have absent 
migrant members, because of transfers from these migrant household 
members. Households experience a 37 percent drop in income per capita 
in the year before the death of an elderly resident. This drop is likely 
driven by the lost earnings of the incapacitated family member and other 
family members who provide care to that person. For households with a 
migrant family member, however, an increase in income of 65 percent 
occurs in such circumstances. When households have a migrant family 
member and a resident suffers from a serious illness, migrant children 
contribute sufficient funds to reduce lost earned income of the household 
and to support additional expenditures related to health care.
Although migrant children help smooth the effects of shocks to 
income and health, these effects might be predominantly experienced by 
households either below or above the poverty line. To examine whether 
insurance against shocks affects transitions into poverty, the analysis 
examined how shocks and migration status affect the probability that a 
household falls below the poverty line (table 2.4).10 The findings are as 
follows:
• Raising the average education of adult members of the household by one 
year leads to a 6 percent decline in the probability that a household is in 
poverty. 
• Those households in which a family member has pension income are 58 
percent less likely to be in poverty. 
• Elderly households with migrant family members are 26 percent less likely 
to have incomes below the poverty line. When this result is contrasted 
with the negligible effect of migrant family members on income levels 
shown in table 2.3, it suggests that migrant family members may play 
an important role in keeping households out of poverty even if they do 
not raise incomes much above this threshold. Although they may not 
boost income for the average household, they may play an important 
role in raising incomes of households that would otherwise fall below 
the poverty line.
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• Migrant children may help insure against poverty generally but not provide 
additional insurance against poverty that is caused by communitywide 
shocks. Negative shocks to the local economy raise the likelihood that a 
household with elderly residents will fall into poverty. This finding is 
evident from the results for model 2 in table 2.4, where adding a com-
munitywide income shock suggests that a 1 percent negative income 
shock experienced by the community will raise the probability that a 
household with elderly residents will fall into poverty by 0.14 percent. 
In contrast to results in table 2.3, one does not observe that migrant 
family members yield significant insurance against the effects of com-
munitywide shocks. This result is reflected in the low and insignificant 
coefficient on the community shock–migrant family member interac-
tion term in model 2, indicating that existence of migrant family 
 members does not appear to insure against the possibility that com-
munitywide shocks drive households with elderly into poverty. 
• Elderly households with a resident who is seriously ill are 25 percent 
more likely to have incomes below the poverty line, but having migrant 
Table 2.4 Factors Affecting Likelihood of Household Poverty of the Elderly, 
Marginal Effects from Probit Model
dependent variable: household below poverty = 1
Model 1 2
Average years of education of adult household members  −0.059*** −0.056***
(0.012) (0.014)
Has family members with pension income −0.577*** −0.671***
(0.066) (0.082)
Has migrant family members −0.260*** −0.275***
(0.084) (0.106)
Community income shock −0.140***
(0.039)
(Community income shock)* (Migrant family members) 0.048
(0.099)
Elder died in the following year 0.248**
(0.124)
Number of observations 5,182 3,558
Source: Cai, Giles, and Wang 2009.
Note: Migrant family member = a member of the household from a previous round is no longer a household 
member and is currently working as a migrant.
Community income shock = change in log income per capita for all other households in the enumeration area.
All models also include years of education, age, age-squared, lives with spouse, lives with adult children, number 
of adult household members, year dummy variables, and enumeration area dummy variables. The model num-
ber shown above corresponds to the model number in the expanded set of results.
Standard errors of model coefficients are shown in parentheses.
*, **, and *** indicate significance of 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
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children removes this effect.11 This finding is evident from the coeffi-
cient on the variable “elder died in the following year” in model 2 of 
table 2.4. 
• These estimates also suggest that migrant children eliminate the effect of 
serious illness on the probability of falling into poverty. Migrant family 
members either return to care for elderly parents who are infirm (Giles 
and Mu 2007), or a migrant child is able to provide transfers sufficient 
to keep the family income stable when an elderly resident becomes 
seriously ill.
On balance, the evidence raises concerns that shocks to the local 
economy and serious health shocks experienced by household members 
affect incomes of the elderly. Given the rural pension pilot, one potential 
value of this formal social insurance would be to provide a base level of 
support that would keep China’s rural elderly from falling into poverty. 
In principle, the rural dibao already plays this role, but coverage is limited 
and the manner in which it is targeted and implemented may further 
limit its effectiveness. Local village leaders responsible for targeting 
households to receive dibao support may have less skill at identifying 
households that suffer from transient poverty rather than chronic pov-
erty. For older workers, transient poverty caused by a shock may quickly 
develop into chronic poverty because aging workers are less able to find 
new income-earning opportunities after falling into poverty.
Conclusion
The evidence in this chapter indicates that the rural elderly are on average 
poorer, more likely to remain poor, and more vulnerable than the younger 
population, as well as substantially poorer than the urban elderly. Location 
also matters more for elderly than younger adults as a determinant of 
poverty. In terms of the factors that affect the incomes of the rural elderly, 
those who have more education or a pension are likely to have higher 
incomes. The effect of having a migrant child is, however, more complex. 
Although having a migrant child has an inconclusive impact on the 
income of elderly rural households, having migrant children has a clearer 
and positive effect in terms of ability to cope with shocks to household 
income, whether communitywide or household specific. 
Given this situation, exploring the sources of support for the rural 
elderly and the extent to which they can be expected to improve their 
lot over time—or, at a minimum, not contribute to its deterioration—is 
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important. The following chapter looks in detail at sources of support 
among the rural elderly, both support from their own earnings and formal 
and informal sources of support other than their own work.
Notes
 1. The estimates are based on the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), 
which is a panel data set containing the same households and individuals from 
1991 through 2006. Because it does not have a good measure of total con-
sumption, income was used to measure the poverty head count, and a house-
hold is considered to be poor if it earns less than the basic needs line (875 
renminbi [RMB] in 2000 yuan). Because incomes in rural China are quite 
volatile, poverty rates calculated using income overstate the share of house-
holds below the poverty line; 2006 is not included because pension income 
was not enumerated that year, and one cannot calculate a consistent measure 
of income. 
 2. The CURES is a national representative survey that collects information on 
the living status and well-being of urban and rural elderly in 20 provinces.
 3. The poverty severity index is Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984), using a 
sensitivity parameter of 2. 
 4. For the early period, the households are grouped by age of the household 
head in 1993, and for the later period, by age of the head in 2000.
 5. Research on consumption smoothing in China has found that households that 
are reasonably well-off are also capable of smoothing the effects of income 
shocks on consumption, whereas poorer households do less well. See Jalan 
and Ravallion (1999) and Giles (2006). 
 6. The analysis decomposes the variances of log income and poverty status to 
show how much of the variance is explained by village location. See Cai, 
Giles, and Wang (2009) for details of the calculation used in this book.
 7. Although location actually explains less variation in income and poverty in 
2004 than in 1993, in a fully integrated economy the contribution of location 
to variation in income is typically considerably lower. Benjamin and others 
(2008) note that within-province income inequality explains 98.5 percent of 
income inequality in Canada, and thus the contribution of geography to 
income inequality (or poverty) remains much greater in China. In other 
developing countries, such as India, which lack nationally integrated labor 
markets, one might expect that geography contributes substantially more to 
the probability of falling into poverty.
 8. For evidence on the relationship between migration and incomes, see Du, 
Park, and Wang (2005) and de Brauw and Giles (2008). For a discussion of 
migration and risk coping, see Giles (2006) and Giles and Yoo (2007).
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 9. Subsequent mortality was viewed as a more reliable proxy for health status 
than self-reported health in early research on retirement decisions in the 
United States. See, for example, Anderson and Burkhauser (1985), Hurd and 
Boskin (1984), and Parsons (1980). Giles and Mu (2007) make use of subse-
quent mortality as a measure of health status in a paper examining whether 
parent illness affects the migration decision of adult children. 
10. To do this, binary response models were estimated in which the outcome is 
equal to one if household income per capita falls below a basic needs poverty 
line (875 RMB per capita in year 2000 RMB yuan).
11. Technical difficulties complicate identifying this effect using a probit model, 
but the interaction term has been examined in a linear probability model. 
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C H A P T E R  3
Sources of Support among the 
Rural Elderly
This chapter examines the sources of support among the rural elderly, 
comparing them with those of the urban elderly and among different sub-
cohorts of the rural elderly. It finds that urban and rural elderly show 
striking differences in their sources of support. Although pension income 
is the most important source of support for urban households, labor 
income and family support remain the primary modes of support for the 
rural elderly. Between the ages of 60 and 70, rural household support 
shifts from primary reliance on labor income to primary reliance on family 
support. In light of the aggregate findings, the chapter then looks in more 
detail at the patterns of family support (including variations between rural 
elderly households with and without migrant adult children) and exam-
ines patterns in the labor supply of the rural elderly.
Sources of Support among China’s Elderly
Major differences exist in the primary sources of support for China’s 
urban and rural elderly and between men and women from both groups 
of elderly. Table 3.1 reports findings on the elderly’s sources of support 
by location and gender for 2005. The differences across groups among the 
elderly are striking, notably the following:
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• Although pensions are the single most significant source of support for 
the urban elderly, they remain a very minor source of support for the 
rural elderly, almost entirely confined to former civil servants and sol-
diers, and former village cadres.1
• In contrast, labor income is a much more significant source of support 
for the rural elderly than for the urban elderly, being the primary source 
of support for 37.9 percent of the rural elderly. 
• Family support is an important source of support for both rural and 
urban elderly households, but its significance among the rural elderly is 
substantially greater.
• As of 2005, the rural dibao was not an important source of income sup-
port for rural or urban elderly households.2 This finding may stem from 
the fact that the rural dibao was still being phased in at the time of the 
survey, although policy has shifted in the intervening period with the 
approval of rural dibao as national policy in 2007 and a resultant expan-
sion in coverage.3 
• Also notable is the inability of the elderly to earn income from prop-
erty. In contrast to member countries of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development historically, or other developing coun-
tries today, the elderly in China have not grown old in an environment 
in which they could accumulate land wealth. Lack of land wealth lim-
its the ability of the elderly to earn income from rents and may also 
limit the scope for encouraging intergenerational transfers from their 
children (who would be prospective heirs).
Looking at sources of support by gender among the rural elderly, fam-
ily support is more important for elderly women and labor income 
Table 3.1 Primary Source of Support for China’s Elderly, 2005
most significant share of support reported
Source of support
Urban Rural
Average Male Female Average Male Female
Labor income 13.0 18.4 7.9 37.9 48.5 27.5
Pensions 45.4 56.9 34.6 4.6 8.1 1.3
Dibao 2.4 1.8 2.9 1.3 1.8 0.9
Insurance and subsidy 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0
Property income 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1
Family support 37.0 20.7 52.3 54.1 39.3 68.5
Other 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 1.7
Source: NBS 2006.
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remains more important for men. As shown in table 3.1, 68.5 percent of 
women over 60 report that financial support from family members is 
their most important source of support, whereas only 27.5 percent report 
that labor income is most important. In contrast, 48.5 percent of elderly 
men report that labor income remains their most important source of 
support; only 39.3 percent report support from family members. When 
distinguishing the importance of pension by gender, a significantly higher 
share of rural men (8.1 percent) than women (1.3 percent) report that 
pension income is their most significant source of financial support. The 
gap between men and women reflects historical differences between 
genders in employment in local government and the military.
Rural elderly in their sixties are more likely to support themselves 
through labor income, whereas those over 70 depend far more on support 
from family members. Table 3.2 shows results by age cohort among the 
rural elderly and emphasizes the differences in financial support between 
younger and older elderly people. Younger elderly rely more on labor 
income, and a shift starts after age 70. Notably, however, nearly a quarter 
of the elderly between 70 and 75 report labor income as their main 
source of support. Apart from family support and labor income, no other 
source of support for the elderly varies significantly by age group. 
Moreover, no other component plays a particularly significant role.
Evidence on Family Support
Until the last few years, policy on pensions and safety nets has not focused 
significantly on the rural elderly because the family was assumed to be an 
adequate source of support. Policy makers had assumed the continued 
Table 3.2 Source of Support for China’s Rural Elderly, by Age Group, 2005
share of income in percent
Source of support
Age group (years)
60+ 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80–84 85+
Labor income 37.9 64.3 45.1 24.4 12.0 4.3 1.7
Pensions 4.6 4.7 5.1 4.7 4.4 3.8 2.6
Dibao 1.3 0.8 1.2 1.5 1.9 2.0 2.1
Insurance and subsidy 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Property income 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
Family support 54.1 28.6 46.6 66.9 79.1 87.2 91.1
Other 1.8 1.2 1.7 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.3
Source: NBS 2006.
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viability of traditional, family-based arrangements for two reasons. First, 
family values remain strong in rural areas, and Confucian filial piety con-
tinues to sustain family care for the elderly. Second, any formal public 
policy response to the needs of the rural elderly may undermine existing 
private arrangements. For example, state transfers to the elderly may 
crowd out existing transfers from younger family members. 
With regard to the reliance on traditional family values, both policy 
makers and other observers have in recent years questioned the view that 
family support for the rural elderly will be sufficient. Fertility decline 
driven by China’s population policies may ultimately lead to a breakdown 
of the traditional support system, but conclusions from research spanning 
the literature on demography and economics disagree on the likeliness of 
this outcome. Zimmer and Kwong (2003) show that more children 
increase the likelihood that the elderly will receive support, but present 
simulation results suggest that declines in fertility alone will not lead to a 
collapse of family-based support for the elderly. Other research has sug-
gested that financial transfers to parents respond to low income and low 
health status in urban areas (Cai, Giles, and Meng 2006), but that in rural 
areas interhousehold transfers are not often observed because they take 
the form of labor input into family farming (Lee and Xiao 1998).4 The 
following sections explore some of these questions empirically.
Changes to Living Arrangements 
and the Well-Being of the Elderly
The share of rural elderly living with their children has declined rapidly, 
both in the long term and in recent years. Changes in living arrangements 
have been cited most frequently as reasons for concern for the well-being 
of the elderly. For example, Benjamin, Brandt, and Rozelle (2000) note 
that in rural northern China, over 85 percent of the elderly lived in 
extended households in 1935, but this figure had dropped to just over 
60 percent by 1995.5 The decline in coresidence with adult children is 
strikingly evident over the six rounds of the China Health and Nutrition 
Survey (CHNS) from 1991 to 2006. Figure 3.1 shows that in the CHNS, 
nearly 70 percent of elderly in rural areas lived with an adult child in 
1991, but by 2006 this share had fallen to just over 40 percent. As elderly 
parent age increases, the probability of coresidence with an adult child 
approaches 100 percent.6
At the same time, a decline in coresidence does not necessarily reflect 
a drop in provision of care to the elderly. In-kind transfers, such as supply 
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of labor on extended family plots, are difficult to pick up in surveys, yet 
such transfers often occur both within and across households. Changes in 
living arrangements reflect the increasing wealth of families. With increas-
ing resources, coresidence may be unnecessary in caring for the elderly. 
Within villages in rural areas, elders and adult children are typically in the 
same small group (a subvillage administrative unit) and live in proximity 
to one another. Given increases in housing wealth in rural areas since the 
mid-1980s, the trend toward nuclear families may signal a wealth effect 
independent of the traditional value of providing support and care to 
elderly parents. 
In addition, the share of rural elderly with an adult child living nearby 
was actually higher. A more important factor may be the proximity of 
adult children—and not whether they coreside. Figure 3.2 summarizes 
the living arrangements by age cohort from the 2004 Research Center for 
Rural Economy (RCRE) supplemental survey and includes information 
on children living within the same village as their elders. Although cores-
idence with adult children was less than 60 percent during the 2003 
reference period among those 60 to 70 years of age, more than half the 
elderly living alone or with a spouse in this age range had at least one 
Figure 3.1 Living Arrangements of China’s Rural Elderly
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adult child living in the village.7 This finding suggests that even though 
coresidence was well below the levels of the 1930s, adult children were 
still potentially available to provide care. 
Evidence suggests that migration decisions of adult children are 
influenced by the well-being of elderly parents. Decline in coresidence 
reflects a decline in support for the elderly only if it is associated 
with increased abandonment of the elderly. The rural elderly may 
have sufficient support if they are receiving transfers from local or 
migrant adult children. Giles and Mu (2007) explore this possibility 
by conducting separate analyses using two different data sources. They 
find a significantly lower probability that a son will work as a migrant 
when a parent is seriously ill. Although parental illness has a statisti-
cally significant effect on migration, it does not completely drive the 
decision to return from migrant destinations. Depending on the data 
set and methodology, the effect of illness varied from a 15 percent to 
26 percent reduction in the probability that a son would be employed 
as a migrant, and this effect was reduced if other siblings remained 
behind in the village. Although this level of responsiveness to elderly 
Figure 3.2 Living Arrangements of China’s Rural Elderly, by Age
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illness is significant, it is not absolute. Moreover, elderly who are rela-
tively healthy may have a much lower standard of living if nonresident 
adult children who are migrants are less likely to make transfers to 
their parents than adult children who live nearby. In light of these 
findings, the next section examines how private transfers respond to 
low income of the elderly, including whether transfer responsiveness 
differs with migrant children.
Do Private Transfers Respond to Income of the Elderly?
Two important reasons exist to examine the responsiveness of transfers 
and transfer levels. First, as China rolls out its national rural pension pro-
gram, concerns may arise about formal support for the elderly crowding 
out transfers from private sources. Second, although the findings in chap-
ter 2 suggest that elderly households with migrant family members may 
be less likely to fall into poverty, those findings are average effects and do 
not explore how transfers vary with pretransfer household income, nor do 
they consider the distribution of transfers and the risks that the elderly 
may fall into poverty if transfers do not materialize.
Much early research on intrafamily transfers used data from developed 
countries and focused on efforts to distinguish whether transfers were 
motivated by altruistic or exchange motives.8 This distinction is impor-
tant because it has implications for how transfers respond to income 
received by elderly households. If an altruistic motive dominates, family 
members outside the household may respond to reduced levels of income 
by providing an offsetting transfer. This possibility may mean that any 
increase in income—a pension payment, for example—would lead to an 
offsetting reduction in private transfers into the household. If the altruis-
tic motive dominates, private transfers to elderly family members will 
likely fall as public transfers increase (private transfers are “crowded out”). 
In contrast, when exchange motives or other motives are more important, 
one is unlikely to observe a significant reduction in such private transfers 
and crowding out is less of a concern. 
This section shows that (a) the risk of private transfers being insuffi-
cient to prevent elderly poverty has increased in recent years and (b) 
public transfers (for example, pensions or dibao) are unlikely to crowd 
out private transfers to the rural elderly even at very low levels of income. 
Thus, the receipt of pensions or targeted public transfers would likely 
improve the welfare of the rural elderly. Moreover, when transfer behav-
ior from an early period (1995–99) is compared with that of a later 
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period (2000–03), a notable increase is seen in the risk that transfers to 
low-income elderly will be insufficient to prevent them from falling into 
poverty.9 Second, although migrants respond to their elderly parents’ low 
income by transferring more income, the wide confidence interval in 
predicted levels of transfers implies that some elderly are at risk of falling 
into poverty. 
Private transfers respond to low pretransfer income regardless of the 
migrant status of adult children. Figure 3.3 shows that transfers from 
family members decline in response to increases in the income level of 
the elderly household. It also shows how transfers respond to pretransfer 
income levels for elderly households that have migrant children and those 
that do not. To highlight changes in transfer responsiveness over time, the 
results are shown separately for the periods 1995–98 and 2000–03. The 
key findings are as follows:
• For both periods and for households with and without migrant adult 
children, net transfers fall sharply as rural elderly household income 
rises. The findings suggest that private transfers continue to respond to 
the low income of elderly parents regardless of migrant status. 
• For the period 1995–98, transfers to elderly households were more 
responsive to income at low levels if the elderly had migrant children 
than if they did not. This finding suggests that, in this earlier period, 
public transfers to the elderly with migrant children would have 
crowded out more private transfers at very low levels of income. 
 However, at income levels near the poverty line, the transfer deriva-
tive was −0.5 for elderly households regardless of whether they had 
migrant children. Thus, even in the 1990s, one would not expect pri-
vate transfers to be crowded out completely by payments from a pub-
lic transfer in elderly households already at or above the poverty line.
• By 2000–03, private net transfers into households with elderly mem-
bers were less responsive to income for households with migrant chil-
dren. This decline in transfer responsiveness holds for the significant 
share of households with incomes ranging from half the poverty line to 
twice that value. It also indicates that concerns about public transfers 
crowding out private transfers are becoming less relevant over time. 
Indeed, the decline in responsiveness of transfers to low income raises 
the possibility that the elderly may be more exposed to the risk of pov-
erty with increases in out-migration of adult children and the increasing 
likelihood that migration of children is permanent.
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Figure 3.3 Net Transfers Received by Rural Elderly, by Migrant Status of 
Adult Children
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To highlight how transfers respond to income at different points in the 
income distribution, table 3.3 reports the transfer response at different 
multiples of the poverty line. As the table shows, the likelihood of trans-
fers falls notably in both periods for elderly households with and without 
migrant children as the income of the elderly household increases.
Thus, during the period 1995–98, elderly households with migrant 
family members appear very unlikely to have income per capita below 
the poverty line after private transfers are included in household income. 
To assess the risk that private transfers are insufficient to keep the elderly 
out of poverty, figure 3.4 shows that the combinations of pretransfer 
income and private transfers are sufficient to keep elderly households 
above the poverty threshold. That threshold is represented in figure 3.4 
as the straight line running from the y-axis when pretransfer income is 
zero to the point on the x-axis where net transfers are −500 renminbi 
(RMB) per capita and the household pretransfer income is just enough 
to keep the household out of poverty. Panels a and b of figure 3.4 show 
the predicted range of net transfers for different levels of pretransfer 
income from 1995 to 1998 for households without and with migrants, 
respectively. Comparing those two figures, more of the lower bound of 
transfers lies below the poverty threshold for households without migrant 
family members. 
After 2000, elderly households with migrant family members are at 
greater risk of falling into poverty. From panels c and d of figure 3.4, one 
can clearly see that households with incomes of less than half the poverty 
line are more at risk, for which transfers will be insufficient to raise total 
income above the poverty line. The lower responsiveness of transfers to 
Table 3.3 Estimated Transfer Derivatives for Households with Elderly Residents
estimates in neighborhood of multiple of the poverty line
Multiple
Income per 
capita (RMB)
Households without 
migrant children
Households with 
migrant children
1996–98 2000–03 1996–98 2000–03 
One-quarter poverty line 119 to 319 −0.84 −0.67 −1.73 −0.63
One-half poverty line 338 to 538 −0.73 −0.57 −1.03 −0.35
Poverty line 775 to 975 −0.52 −0.46 −0.49 −0.25
Twice poverty line 1,650 to 1,850 −0.28 −0.35 −0.40 −0.21
Four times poverty line 3,400 to 3,600 −0.11 −0.24 −0.31 −0.20
Sources: Giles, Wang, and Zhao 2010, estimates based on RCRE Rural Household Surveys for 1995–2003 from 
 Anhui, Henan, Jiangsu, and Shanxi provinces and the matched RCRE 2004.
Note: All values are in 2000 RMB yuan per capita. The nutrition-based poverty line is equal to 875 RMB yuan per 
capita.
Figure 3.4 Confidence Intervals for Net Transfers Received by Rural Elderly, by Migrant Status of Adult Children
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low incomes suggests that a noncontributory pension or other support 
mechanism is unlikely to crowd out private transfers. 
Evidence summarized in table 3.4 also suggests that elderly house-
holds with pretransfer income per capita below one-half the nutrition-
based poverty line are at particular risk of falling into poverty. Table 3.4 
summarizes the range of transfers at five multiples of the poverty line. 
When considering the results from the four-province analysis of trans-
fers, one should remember that although poorer areas of Anhui, Shanxi, 
and Henan are included in the analysis sample, these provinces are gener-
ally considered middle income, and Jiangsu is included among upper-in-
come coastal provinces. If transfer responsiveness to low income is also 
declining among households with migrant children in poorer regions of 
China, then a higher share of elderly households are likely to be at risk of 
slipping into poverty. 
The Labor Supply and “Retirement” Decision of 
China’s Rural Elderly
Recent studies of retirement decisions in rural China suggest that rural 
elderly “work until they drop” and stop working only when they are 
physically incapacitated (Pang, de Brauw, and Rozelle 2004). Benjamin, 
Brandt, and Fan (2003) find evidence suggesting that the likelihood of 
working in agriculture declines significantly with increases in family 
wealth, raising the possibility that public transfers might facilitate reduced 
labor supply of the rural elderly. In China’s urban areas, where many of 
the elderly rely on pension support, relatively few elderly continue to 
work in retirement. In contrast, the discussion earlier noted that nearly 
50 percent of rural men and 28 percent of women over retirement age 
state that income from work remains their primary source of support. 
Because a considerable number of elderly receiving family support also 
continue to work, these figures significantly understate the degree to 
which China’s rural elderly continue to work after retirement age.
Even as family wealth and incomes have increased among households 
in rural China, in recent years China’s rural elderly were more likely 
to work. Employment rates increase at every age for elderly relatives 
of RCRE panel households over the period from 1993 to 2003 (see 
figure 3.5).10 In fact, continued employment of the elderly may be an 
important contributing factor to the rising incomes of rural households. 
As rural household incomes increase with the migrant employment of 
Table 3.4 Estimated Range of Transfers to Households with Elderly Residents, Results for Neighborhoods of Different Multiples of the 
Poverty Line
Multiple
Pretransfer 
income per 
capita 
Portion of 
estimated 
range
1995–98 2000–03
Households 
without migrant 
children
Households 
with migrant 
children
Households 
without migrant 
children
Households 
with migrant 
children
One-quarter poverty line 119 to 319 Upper bound 1,356 1,643 1,489 1,655
Mean 948 1,216 1,081 1,071
Lower bound 531 718 664 479
One-half poverty line 338 to 538 Upper bound 1,155 1,276 1,293 1,484
Mean 811 910 942 953
Lower bound 469 610 601 461
Poverty line 775 to 975 Upper bound 785 908 1,019 1,381
Mean 517 648 709 821
Lower bound 307 420 473 290
Two times poverty line 1,650 to 1,850 Upper bound 421 605 701 1192
Mean 212 369 433 615
Lower bound 87 120 216 55
Four times poverty line 3,400 to 3,600 Upper bound 125 216 259 862
Mean −48 −137 −7 274
  Lower bound −185 −568 −249 −345
Sources: Giles, Wang, and Zhao 2010, estimates based on RCRE Rural Household Surveys for 1995–2003 from Anhui, Henan, Jiangsu, and Shanxi provinces and the matched RCRE 2004.
Note: All values are in 2000 RMB yuan per capita. The nutrition-based poverty line is equal to 875 RMB yuan per capita.
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Figure 3.5 Employment Status of the Rural Elderly over Time
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younger adults, older parents remain behind and continue farming the 
household land. 
Features of China’s land tenure system may contribute to the effect of 
child migration on the labor supply of the elderly. Access to land in rural 
China has long been the safety net for able-bodied rural residents, but 
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restrictions on the ability to transfer land may also influence labor supply 
decisions. The inability to rent land further reduces the income of an 
elderly person in retirement, and the possibility that village leaders will 
reallocate land that is not kept productive may create additional incen-
tives for older farmers to continue working household land. Changes in 
the Land Law enacted in 2002 and 2003 may have facilitated land trans-
fer and presumably may also have influenced the labor supply decisions 
of older rural residents. 
No systematic relationship between elderly retirement and migration 
status of children is immediately evident. To examine the possibility that 
migration of children is systematically related to labor supply decisions of 
the elderly, figure 3.6 shows the share of age cohorts employed by 
migrant status for men and women in 1998 and 2003. At the same time, 
however, migration status of children and the labor supply decision of an 
elderly household resident are both systematically related to household 
composition, family wealth, earning ability of family members, and health 
status of the elderly person in question. To better characterize the rela-
tionship between (a) migration and (b) retirement and labor supply deci-
sions of the elderly, it is important to explicitly model the labor supply 
decision of the elderly while controlling for these other factors.
The employment status and location of adult children may have an 
important effect on the retirement decision. However, the likely effect of 
a migrant child is ambiguous. On one hand, a migrant adult child may 
raise household income through increased remittances more than the 
migrant lowers income through lack of work in agriculture. In this case, 
one would expect the existence of a migrant son or daughter to be nega-
tively associated with elderly parent labor supply. On the other hand, if 
loss of work capacity when a child migrates is not offset by remittances, 
migration of an adult child may make an elderly parent’s retirement more 
difficult. Moreover, if residents of a village lose land when it is not kept 
productive, land tenure insecurity may create an additional disincentive 
for retirement. 
This analysis finds notable variation by gender differences according to 
whether the individual is among the younger or older elderly. Coefficient 
estimates from labor supply models of participation and hours worked in 
productive activity are shown in tables 3.5 and 3.6, respectively. Labor 
supply of the elderly is affected by the following factors:
• Increases in actual (or potential) household income from other sources 
reduce the likelihood of an older person still working. This factor is evident 
Figure 3.6 Correlation of Employment of Elderly and Migrant Status of Adult Children
a. Men, 1998 b. Men, 2003
c. Women, 1998 d. Women, 2003
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in table 3.5 from examining the effects of pension receipt and educa-
tional attainment on employment. For each 1,000 RMB per capita 
received as pension income, the probability that a man works (whether 
in his sixties or seventies) falls by 8 percent, and the probability that 
a woman works falls by about 6 percent. Educational attainment of 
men in their sixties has no significant effect on employment, but each 
additional year of education is associated with a 1.6 percent reduction 
in the probability that a woman in her sixties is employed, and a 1.2 
percent to 1.3 percent reduction in the probability that elderly in 
their seventies are working. An increase in the average years of educa-
tion of other family members has an even stronger depressing effect 
on labor force participation: higher average levels of education are 
associated with higher permanent income of the family, which facili-
tates retirement. 
• Ill health, as represented by increases in the activity of daily living 
(ADL) z-score,11 also lowers the likelihood that an individual engages 
in productive activities. Because men are often tasked with more 
Table 3.5 Factors Affecting Labor Supply Decisions of the Elderly, Linear Model
dependent variable: engaged in productive activities during the year
Variable
Ages 60–70 Ages 70–80
Men Women Men Women
Has migrant member  0.009 0.058 0.010 0.081***
(0.041) (0.046) (0.046) (0.032)
Years of education  −0.005 −0.016*** −0.013*** −0.012**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Years of education of other 
household members
−0.017*** −0.020*** −0.018*** −0.015***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
ADL z-score  −0.113*** −0.079*** −0.103*** −0.049**
(0.029) (0.026) (0.022) (0.020)
Income from 
pension/1,000 RMB
−0.083*** −0.064*** −0.084*** −0.060***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
R-squared 0.237 0.287 0.261 0.179
Observations 483 586 705 818
Sources: CHNS 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, and 2004.
Note: Migrant family member = a member of the household from a previous round is no longer a household 
member and has moved outside the home province.
All models include age, age-squared, household demographic variables (number of household members over 
60, number of children younger than 3, children 3–7, children 8–13, children 14–16, spouse present), and year 
dummy variables interacted with regions to control for provincewide macroeconomic effects.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. 
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physically demanding jobs in agriculture, this effect is, not surpris-
ingly, stronger for men in both age categories than for women. A one 
standard deviation increase in the ADL z-score is associated with 
11.3 percent and 7.9 percent decreases in probability of employ-
ment for men and women, respectively, in their sixties, and a 10.3 
percent and 4.9 percent decrease, respectively, for men and women 
in their seventies.
• Migration of adult children is weakly associated with increased labor sup-
ply. A positive association exists between a migrant child and increased 
labor supply, but it is not statistically significant for men or for women 
under 70. Lost farm income and uncertainty about land tenure likely 
dominate the effects of increased income from remittances when the 
elderly make decisions about working. Women over 70, however, are 
8.1 percent more likely to continue working (most likely in agriculture) 
if the household has a migrant child. 
Evidence on hours worked, presented in table 3.6, suggests that 
migrant adult children have the strongest effect on the work behavior of 
women over age 70. Women over 70 with a migrant child work 411 
hours more during a year, or the equivalent of 10 40-hour workweeks. For 
regions of the country that plant two crops a year, that would amount to 
full-time work during the agricultural busy season. The effects of educa-
tion on hours worked are of the same direction as in the employment 
models of table 3.5, but once employed, education itself does not strongly 
affect the number of hours worked. 
As might be expected, the number of hours worked by the rural 
elderly is also very sensitive to their health status and to income from 
pensions. An increase in one standard deviation of the ADL index is asso-
ciated with a 417-hour reduction in hours worked by men in their sixties, 
and a reduction of 294 hours by men in their seventies. Women in their 
sixties reduce labor supply by 300 hours with a one standard deviation 
increase in their ADL index, whereas women in their seventies reduce 
labor supply by 212 hours in response to a similar worsening in their 
health. Pension income also has a stronger depressing effect on hours 
worked by men in their sixties. 
The urban elderly are much less likely to work after 60 than are the 
rural elderly. And the results presented here suggest that any mechanism 
providing the rural elderly with an income flow in old age will likely 
reduce both employment and hours worked. As China’s government rolls 
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out a national pension system for the rural elderly, rural residents will 
likely choose to “retire” rather than work until they are no longer able to 
do so, depending of course on the benefit level.
Conclusion
Whereas the urban elderly receive significant support from pensions, the 
rural elderly rely primarily on their own labor income and financial sup-
port from their children. More men over 60 rely primarily on their own 
labor income for support, whereas elderly women are somewhat more 
dependent on transfers from family members. Evidence presented on 
responsiveness of private transfers to income levels and on the determi-
nants of elderly labor supply suggests that the introduction of a pension 
system may lead to more security for the elderly without requiring them 
to continue working into old age.
Private transfers are responsive to low levels of elderly income, but 
they do not perfectly crowd out income from other sources. At levels of 
income below the poverty line, transfers from adult children increase as 
elderly income decreases. When elderly incomes are at and even below 
Table 3.6 Factors Affecting Hours Worked by the Elderly, Tobit Model
dependent variable: hours worked
Variable
Ages 60–70 Ages 70–80
Men Women Men Women
Has migrant child
 
44.3 −7.6 199.1 411.2** 
(168.6) (146.3) (162.1) (162.7) 
Years of education
 
15.2 −1.5 −27.0* −14.3 
(18.3) (16.1) (15.1) (21.5) 
Education of other 
household members
−12.3 −53.1*** −40.4** −45.5***
(19.6) (16.6) (18.8) (16.0) 
ADL z-score
 
−416.9*** −299.9*** −294.4*** −211.6***
(132.7) (94.8) (85.1) (70.6) 
Income from 
pension/1,000 RMB
−447.9*** −314.1*** −350.4*** −308.0***
(71.1) (56.7) (52.9) (49.0) 
Observations 479 586 705 816 
Sources: CHNS 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000 and 2004.
Note: Migrant family member = a member of the household from a previous round is no longer a household 
member and has moved outside the home province.
All models include age, age-squared, household demographic variables (number of household members over 
60, number of children younger than 3, children 3–7, children 8–13, children 14–16, spouse present), and year 
dummy variables interacted with regions to control for province-wide macroeconomic effects.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
64       The Elderly and Old Age Support in Rural China
the poverty line, however, private transfers are not perfectly crowded out 
by increases in income. A social welfare benefit that raises incomes of the 
elderly will not crowd out private transfers. 
Migrant children continue to provide remittance support to their par-
ents, but the predicted range of transfers suggests growing risk that low-
income elderly may be left in poverty. On average, the predicted transfer 
from adult children is sufficient to maintain elderly incomes above the 
poverty line. When the range of potential transfers is considered, how-
ever, elderly with migrant children clearly face more risk that private 
transfers will be insufficient to maintain standards of living above the 
poverty line. 
Elderly with higher incomes are less likely to work, as are elderly who 
are in poor health. Elderly with nonlabor income from pensions or in 
households with higher levels of education, and thus more income-
earning potential, are less likely to participate in income-earning activi-
ties. If the elderly receive some type of social welfare support, they are 
more likely to exit the labor force when they are over 60. 
Elderly in poor health are less likely to work. Declines in health sta-
tus associated with decreases in ability to perform daily tasks are associ-
ated with lower participation in work activity and fewer working hours 
for those who are still working. Improving use of the health care system 
for preventive purposes may keep older workers productive and earning 
incomes for a longer period of their lives. Further research examining 
the effects of the New Cooperative Medical System is warranted to 
determine whether it facilitates improved health and work capacity of 
older workers.
Migration of adult children may significantly affect the work status of 
elderly women. Having a migrant child in the family raises the probability 
that a woman over 70 will still be in the labor force and, conditional on 
working, will work more hours in a year. For men and women under 70, 
a migrant child has a positive but statistically insignificant effect on par-
ticipation in income-earning activities.
Notes
 1. The data were collected before initiation of the national rural pension pilot 
program in 2009.
 2. This finding is consistent with findings in the World Bank’s China poverty 
assessment (Chaudhuri and Datt 2009) using other National Bureau of 
Statistics data.
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 3. See World Bank (forthcoming) for a detailed discussion of the evolution of 
rural dibao and other forms of rural social assistance, noting coverage expan-
sion of rural dibao from just over 8 million in 2005 to almost 48 million in 
2009.
 4. Using other methods, Cameron and Cobb-Clark (2008) find no evidence that 
transfers to parents respond to low parent income in Indonesia. 
 5. Selden (1993) concludes that a transition to the nuclear family imposes a 
heavy price on the rural elderly. Living arrangements are thought to be impor-
tant for elderly support across East Asia, including Cambodia (Zimmer and 
Kim 2002), Thailand (Knodel and Chayovan 1997), and Vietnam (Anh and 
others 1997). 
 6. Two very different conclusions are consistent with evidence of greater inci-
dence of coresidence with age: the oldest, who are more likely to be infirm, 
tend to move in with adult children; alternatively, if coresidence has an effect 
on the quality of care provided, then perhaps only the elderly living with 
adult children reach old age. 
 7. Coresidence in rural areas of the four RCRE provinces was also somewhat 
higher than that observed for rural areas of the CHNS panel. 
 8. Barro (1974), Becker (1974), and Cox (1987) make important distinctions 
highlighting different motives for transfers. Much of the empirical research in 
the United States has suggested that intergenerational inter vivos transfers are 
driven by exchange motives (for example, Cox and Rank 1992; McGarry 
1999) rather than by altruistic motives. However, in the United States, the 
social security safety net provides substantial insurance against poverty in old 
age, and thus it is not surprising to find an emphasis on the flow of resources 
from older to younger generations.
 9. Knowing whether a household has family members who have migrated is 
important for making comparisons across households with migrant children 
and those with family members living locally. The most appropriate existing 
data source for the study of transfer behavior is the RCRE household survey, 
complemented by a supplemental survey conducted in RCRE households in 
2004. This book uses the 1995 to 2003 waves of RCRE’s annual household 
survey from four provinces (Anhui, Henan, Jiangsu, and Shanxi) in which a 
supplemental survey (Supplemental Rural Household Social Network, Labor 
Allocation, and Land Use Survey) was carried out in collaboration with 
Michigan State University in 2004. A description of the RCRE survey and a 
comparison with other household surveys in China can be found in 
Benjamin, Brandt, and Giles (2005). An important feature of the survey is 
that it enumerated characteristics of former household members, including 
their current location and educational attainment. Among the factors influ-
encing the size of private transfers, the analysis includes the number of 
children (which captures the effect of the potential transfer network size on 
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which rural elderly can rely for private transfers) and average education of 
children living outside the household (which proxies for the quality of the 
network). Other regressors included in the analysis are age, years of school-
ing, marital status, whether any household members are in school, number 
of household residents, number of working household residents, shares of 
household residents in different demographic categories, numbers of non-
resident family members in different demographic categories, village vari-
ables to control for the local economic environment, and province-year 
variables to control for macroeconomic shocks. The analysis uses the 
approach introduced by Yatchew (2003) and implemented for analysis of 
transfers in China by Cai, Giles, and Meng (2006). 
10. The information comes from a retrospective work history carried out as part 
of a supplemental survey conducted with RCRE in 2004. The supplemental 
survey asked about the work history of current and former household resi-
dents and their parents.
11. In the CHNS, activities of daily living (ADLs) are captured by questions 
asking individuals over age 50 to rate the difficulty from 1 (no difficulty) 
to 4 (cannot do at all) of the following activities: walking a kilometer; sit-
ting continuously for two hours; standing up after sitting for a long time; 
climbing one staircase; lifting or raising a 5 kg bag; squatting down, kneel-
ing down or bending over; bathing yourself; eating by yourself; putting on 
your clothes; and using the toilet. Average responses are calculated for male 
and female elderly, and then z-scores are calculated for each individual. 
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C H A P T E R  4
Saving Decisions in Rural China
This chapter examines the saving behavior of both working-age rural 
adults and the rural elderly. It first discusses China’s high saving rates 
and then reviews (a) descriptive evidence on saving behavior with an 
eye toward possible explanations for saving decisions and (b) differ-
ences in saving behavior of households with and without migrant fam-
ily members and households with and without social security. The 
chapter finds that saving-rate patterns of rural households differ sig-
nificantly over the age distribution, by migration status of family 
members and by social security coverage. Rural households without 
elderly members have higher saving rates; those with migrant mem-
bers have higher saving rates than those without. As might be 
expected, saving rates decline with age after 55, but average saving 
rates always remain positive, even into advanced old age. Little com-
parable decline occurs in saving rates in elderly households with 
migrants, which likely reflects the perceived transitory nature of 
remittance income. The difference in saving behavior between rural 
households with and without social security benefits, however, is sig-
nificant and consistent over time.
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Why Is the Household Saving Rate So High in China?
The household saving rate in China has been increasing since the reform 
era started in 1978, although it has been more volatile over time in rural 
areas than in urban areas. Figure 4.1 shows the trends in household saving 
rates for rural and urban China over the reform period. From 1978 to 
2008, the rural household saving rate was higher in most years than the 
urban rate, rising from 13.1 percent to 23.1 percent over the period and 
peaking at 28.6 percent in 1999. Reflecting the greater variability of 
income in rural areas, one also observes more volatility around the trend 
of the rural saving rate than for urban households. In the early reform 
period, the rural saving rate rose to 22.9 percent in 1984 after successful 
implementation of the household responsibility system, but it dropped 
sharply during the inflationary years of the late 1980s and the subsequent 
slowdown during the early 1990s. The saving rate again trended upward 
Figure 4.1 Trends of Household Saving Rates in Rural and Urban China
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between 1995 and 1999, then leveled off at over 25 percent for the fol-
lowing four years before dropping from 2003 to 2006. The urban saving 
rate has fluctuated less around a consistent upward trend since the early 
1990s and in recent years has been higher than the rural saving rate. The 
effect of the global financial crisis on saving rates is still unknown.
China’s high saving rate has received much interest and has raised 
concerns in both policy and research communities. The high saving rate 
of households, enterprises, and the government has facilitated the high 
investment rates that have fueled China’s rapid growth, but it has also 
aroused worries about the imbalance between investment and domestic 
consumption. Cross-country empirical comparisons suggest that China’s 
high saving rate is policy driven, because one would otherwise expect it 
to decline with industrialization and urbanization (Kuijs 2005, 2006). 
Moreover, the macroeconomics literature suggests that reducing savings 
may be favorable for China’s sustained economic growth and may help 
realize balanced growth (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2006; Hofman and 
Kuijs 2007).
Macroeconomists have adapted life-cycle theories to explain high 
household saving rates in China. The life-cycle saving hypothesis predicts 
that saving rates will be higher when one is young than when one is old. 
Therefore, a younger population age structure will lead to higher saving 
rates. China’s demographic transition is unique in its pace (see chapter 1). 
China’s baby boom of the late 1950s and 1960s and the implementation 
of family planning policies in the 1970s have resulted in a population age 
structure favorable for high saving rates since the 1980s and have pro-
vided a “demographic dividend” (Cai and Wang 2005). Market-oriented 
reforms and development strategy adjustments have created an institu-
tional environment favorable for harvesting the demographic dividend. 
The rising saving rate is associated with a declining dependency ratio 
from the mid-1980s onward and can be expected to fall with the accel-
eration of population aging (Modigliani and Cao 2004).
Microeconomic studies have paid more attention to increasing risk and 
uncertainty facing households during economic transition, and they sug-
gest that risk and uncertainty may have contributed to the rising saving 
rates of rural and urban households. Breaking the “iron rice bowl” through 
the reforms of the 1990s brought about unemployment risk and raised the 
uncertainty faced by urban households. To cope with potential layoff and 
dislocation, urban households increased their precautionary savings (Meng 
2003). From 1995 to 2005, the average urban household saving rate in 
China rose by 7 percentage points, to about one-quarter of disposable 
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income. The unusual age pattern of saving rates, in which younger and 
older households save more than middle-aged households, reflects the ris-
ing private burden of expenditures on housing, education, and health care, 
which may be felt more keenly as a result of credit constraints and finan-
cial underdevelopment (Chamon and Prasad 2010). In rural areas, only 
about 10 percent of savings of rural households can be attributed to pre-
caution against natural risks, and migration has reduced exposure to this 
source of risk by providing an alternative source of income (Giles and Yoo 
2007). Thus, precautionary saving against weather-related shocks in rural 
areas may have fallen even as saving rates continued to rise.1
The sharp decline in the rural saving rate in recent years may be driven 
by a reduction in two other motives for saving: (a) the cost of compulsory 
education and (b) the potential cost of health shocks. In recent years, the 
government introduced policies to provide free compulsory education to 
rural residents and to lower exposure to financial risk associated with 
health shocks by establishing the New Cooperative Medical System. 
These policy measures may reduce burdens on rural households and 
reduce the precautionary motive for saving associated with the potential 
for high health care costs. Changes in the composition of rural consump-
tion show that education expenditures dropped from 12.1 percent in 
2003 to 8.6 percent in 2008, but that health and medical expenditures 
increased from 6.0 percent to 6.7 percent over the same period. The 
proportion of food expenditures dropped from 45.6 percent in 2003 to 
43.7 percent in 2008, but the proportion of other expenditures, including 
clothing, housing, durable goods, communications, and transportation, 
increased over that period. 
In rural areas, high saving rates are positively correlated with high 
income. Figure 4.2 shows average saving rates of rural households by 
income quintile for 2003 and 2007. In 2007, rural households in the 
highest income group saved 40 percent of their capita income, whereas 
those in the lowest income group dissaved at a rate of −37.4 percent, 
presumably to smooth their consumption. The difference in saving rates 
across the second, third, and fourth income groups is about 10 percent 
for each. Saving rates for each income quintile decreased by 2007 com-
pared with those of 2003, but the magnitude of the decrease was greatest 
for the lowest quintile. These patterns for saving are consistent with pre-
dictions of the permanent income hypothesis in an environment in which 
household incomes vary considerably (Deaton 1990; Paxson 1992). In 
years with large positive shocks to income, saving rates would be high; in 
years with sharp negative shocks, one would expect significant dissaving.
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Saving Behavior and Migration
This section uses a recent subsample of the Research Center for Rural 
Economy (RCRE) panel to examine how saving patterns vary with the 
presence of migrant family members.2 First, two definitions of household 
savings suggested by Paxson (1992) are compared. In the first, savings 
equals net income minus consumption expenditure, whereas the second 
treats expenditures on durable goods and housing as a form of savings. 
These two definitions produce different rural saving rates, although they 
have very similar trends. Figure 4.3 shows that the saving rate of rural 
households was 34.4 percent in 2003 and rose to 40.6 percent in 2005. 
It then dropped to 37.3 percent in 2006. If one compares saving rates 
from RCRE households with National Bureau of Statistics data, the 
Figure 4.2 Rural Saving Rates, by Income Quintile 
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 former are higher by 8.5 to 19.1 percentage points. The following analy-
sis uses the first definition of savings to examine the saving profile of 
rural households over the age distribution, by migration status of family 
members and by social security coverage.
Households without elderly members have had higher saving rates 
than those with them, although the gap appears to have narrowed in 
recent years. Figure 4.4 compares the saving rates of rural households with 
and without elderly members. From 2003 to 2006, rural households with-
out elderly saved more than those with elderly. In 2003, the saving rate of 
rural households without elderly was 36.3 percent, whereas it was 29.8 
percent for those with elderly, a difference of 6.5 percentage points. In 
2006, the saving rates of rural households with and without elderly were 
35.7 percent and 38.2 percent, respectively, dropping by 2.4 percentage 
Figure 4.3 Rural Household Saving Rates, 2003–06
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points. These descriptive statistics are consistent with a prediction from 
life-cycle theory that families with a higher number of elderly members 
are likely to save less than those with younger adults.
Higher average saving rates among households with migrants might 
be expected for three reasons. First, households with migrants have 
more insurance against negative income shocks and thus will tend to 
dissave less than households without migrants when hit by such shocks. 
Second, rural households are to some extent “permanent income savers.” 
If income remitted from a migrant family member is viewed as  transitory 
(or at least less permanent), then one may expect households with 
migrants to save remittances. Third, migration may be driven in part by 
credit market failures, and migrant family members may save migrant 
earnings in anticipation of investing in housing or durable goods. In this 
Figure 4.4 Saving Rates of Rural Households with and without Elderly, 2003–06
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case, migration and saving decisions are made jointly, and one would 
expect to see higher saving among families with migrants.3
From 2003 to 2006, rural households with migrants had higher sav-
ing rates than those without migrants. Figure 4.5 shows the saving rates 
for rural households with and without migrants. In 2003, the saving 
rates of rural households with and without migrants were 37.4 percent 
and 30.8 percent, respectively, a difference of 6.6 percentage points. 
The largest difference between rural households with and without 
migrants was 13.0 percentage points in 2005. 
Saving rates of rural households with elderly are also higher if they 
have migrants. As shown in figure 4.6, the saving rates of households with 
elderly members that have migrants are higher than those without 
migrants, and the difference between the two rates fluctuates over time. 
Figure 4.5 Saving Rates of Rural Households with and without 
Migration, 2003–06
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Source: RCRE, MOA, Repeated Household Data, estimated by Cai, Giles, and Wang 2009.
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In 2003, the saving rate of rural households with elderly and with 
migrants was 32.3 percent, 5.3 percentage points higher than those with-
out migrants. The gap between saving rates in 2004 was much smaller at 
0.8 percentage points; but by 2005, it was 19.0 percent before falling 
again to 6.2 percent in 2006. 
As might be predicted, saving rates change over the life cycle. 
Figure 4.7 shows life-cycle patterns in the saving decisions of rural 
households and the resulting nonlinear relationship between saving 
rates and age.4 Although saving rates were higher for all ages in 2006, 
life-cycle patterns over the age distribution were similar. In 2006, the 
saving rate decreased from age 20 to 40, but increased from 40 to 55, 
and then steadily declined with age after 55. High saving rates among 
the young in urban China are frequently explained by the high cost of 
Figure 4.6 Saving Rates of Rural Households with Elderly, with and without 
Migration, 2003–06
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housing and imperfect credit markets, and housing and durable goods 
costs likely contribute to high savings among the rural young as well 
(Chamon and Prasad 2010). Marriage-market competition in a world 
of rising male-female sex ratios may exert further upward pressure on 
housing prices in this environment and create further incentives for 
saving (Wei and Zhang 2011). The decline in saving rates among the 
old is consistent with standard life-cycle theory, although on average, 
saving remains positive well into old age. 
As shown in figure 4.8, the saving rate of rural households with 
migrants declines little with age, but an earlier and more pronounced 
decrease occurs for elderly households without migrants. Across the age 
distribution, saving rates and evidence of life-cycle saving differ consider-
ably across households with and without migrants. The higher saving 
rates of elderly with migrant family members likely reflects less dissaving 
in the face of extreme shocks to health or earning and is likely related to 
the perceived transitory nature of remittance income. 
The difference in saving behavior between rural households with 
and without social insurance is significant and consistent over time—
households with social insurance have notably lower saving rates. 
Figure 4.9 shows the saving rates of rural households with and without 
Figure 4.7 Saving Rates of Rural Households, 2003 and 2006
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Figure 4.8 Saving Rates of Rural Households with and without Migrants, 2006
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Figure 4.9 Saving Rates of Rural Households with and without Social Insurance
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social insurance from 2003 to 2006.5 As discussed earlier, the provision 
of social insurance can make individuals and households feel more 
secure about spending, which helps reduce household savings. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that rural households receiving social insurance ben-
efits have a lower saving rate compared with those without benefits. 
The evidence from the quintile income groups further confirms that 
rural households with social insurance save less than those without cov-
erage. In figure 4.10, the highest income group has the greatest saving 
rate: rural households without social insurance save 51.3 percent of 
household income, whereas those with benefits save 42.6 percent of 
household income. However, the largest difference in saving rates lies in 
the lowest income group, which has a 23.8 percentage point difference 
in saving rates between rural households with and without social insur-
ance participation. 
Conclusion
Saving rate patterns of rural households differ significantly over the age 
distribution, by migration status of family members and by social security 
coverage. Rural households without elderly members have higher saving 
Figure 4.10 Saving Rates of Rural Households with and without Social Insurance, 
2006, by Quintile
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rates, although the gap is narrowing, and those with migrant members 
have higher saving rates than those without. As might be expected, the 
saving rate declines with age after 55, but the average saving rate is always 
positive, even into advanced old age. Little comparable decline occurs in 
saving rates in elderly households with migrants, which likely reflects the 
perceived transitory nature of remittance income. The difference in sav-
ing behavior between rural households with and without social insurance 
benefits is significant and consistent over time, which is further verified 
when findings are broken down by income quintile.
Saving provides an informal mechanism for individuals and rural 
households to cope with uncertainty and risk. As discussed in this chapter, 
the high saving rate in China is probably related to increasing risk and 
uncertainty facing households during economic transition. Given that the 
Chinese government strongly emphasizes the welfare of ordinary people 
as it tries to rebalance the economy, recent initiatives to expand the rural 
safety net and social insurance system are welcome instruments not only 
for supporting household welfare, particularly for elderly households, but 
also as economic tools to help reduce precautionary motives for saving 
and to boost consumption.
Notes
 1. Wei and Zhang (2011) provide compelling evidence that China’s high saving 
rate may be driven, in part, by rising male-female sex ratios. As the sex ratio 
rises, Chinese parents with a son raise their savings in a competitive manner 
to improve their son’s relative attractiveness for marriage. The pressure on 
savings spills over to other households.
 2. The analysis draws on a different subsample of eight provinces, including 
Anhui, Chongqing, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Jilin, Shandong, Shanxi, and 
Xinjiang, with 4,100–4,600 rural households surveyed annually between 
2003 and 2006.
 3. Alternatively, a data issue may be driving the observation: the RCRE house-
hold survey asks about the earnings and expenditures of migrants as part of the 
household survey. If expenditures of migrants are not observed as well as 
incomes, this exclusion will lead to mechanically higher saving rates among 
migrant households, although net income for migrants is used in this analysis.
 4. This measurement uses a nonparametric locally weighted regression of saving 
rates against the age of the household head.
 5. Household expenditures for insurance (including asset insurance, life insur-
ance, production insurance, education insurance, and pension insurance) are 
used to identify whether rural households have social insurance.
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C H A P T E R  5
Evolution of the Rural Pension 
System in China
The previous chapters of this book examined various aspects of the wel-
fare of the rural elderly in China. On the basis of findings on poverty and 
vulnerability, sources of support for the rural elderly, demographic trends, 
and saving behavior, the rural poor clearly are unusually subject to pov-
erty and are also highly dependent on private sources (primarily their 
own labor and family support) to sustain adequate levels of welfare in old 
age. The analysis also showed that a number of trends suggest that the 
challenges of sustaining rural welfare may increase in coming years, even 
in the face of continued solid growth. The evidence thus supports a 
rationale for public intervention through transfers for the rural elderly, 
which should not crowd out private sources of support too significantly. 
A further important dimension in the discussion of public intervention in 
support of the rural elderly is the broader desire of Chinese policy makers 
to rebalance their economy toward greater emphasis on domestic 
demand, a shift that may be inhibited by high levels of precautionary 
This chapter was prepared by Philip O’Keefe, based on a background study for this report 
by Wu (2009), which includes a literature review, a policy assessment, and detailed reviews 
of current rural pension pilots in selected cities (Beijing, Baoji in Shaanxi Province, Yantai 
in Shandong Province, and Suzhou in Anhui Province).
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saving among both the rural working-age rural population and the elderly. 
In that light, a macroeconomic rationale may also underlie recent govern-
ment efforts to expand public transfers for the rural elderly, thus helping 
reduce overly high levels of saving and freeing private resources for con-
sumption during working life and in old age.
A key policy tool for improving welfare of the rural elderly, with 
which the Chinese authorities have experimented on and off over the 
past two decades, is a widespread rural pension system. In recent years, 
this system has received renewed impetus with the commitment of the 
16th plenary meeting of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2006 
to establish a comprehensive social security system that will cover all 
urban and rural residents by 2020. This commitment is reflected in the 
Law on Social Insurance of 2010, which provides the legal framework 
for a pension scheme for rural residents. State Council Document 1 of 
2009 endorsed accelerated efforts for “establishing a new rural pension 
system, which is to be financed from individual contributions, collective 
subsidy and government subsidy” (State Council 2009a). These com-
mitments are reflected in the introduction of a national rural pension 
pilot in the second half of 2009 that covered 23 percent of counties by 
the end of 2010 and is expected to achieve full geographic coverage by 
the end of 2012. A scheme for urban residents with a similar design 
became national policy in June 2011, adding to the significance of con-
sidering the rural pension scheme design. This chapter outlines the 
evolution of the Chinese rural pension system over the past two 
decades, with a particular focus on provincial pilots during the 2000s 
and the national pilot.
The evolution of the rural pension system in China can be divided into 
four main phases: (a) an initiation and expansion phase from 1986 to 
1998, (b) a contraction and stagnation phase from 1999 to 2002, (c) a 
renewal phase of piloting toward development of a national rural pension 
system (2003 to 2009), and (d) the national rural pension pilot from 
2009 onward. Each phase is discussed in turn below. 
Initiation and Expansion of Rural Pensions: 1986–98
The initial exploration of rural pensions was set out in the Seventh Five-
Year Plan (1986–90), which noted that “efforts should be made to study 
how to establish a rural pension system, launch and gradually expand 
pilot schemes in line with economic development” (State Council 1986, 
193–94). This endeavor was built on through county-level pilots led by 
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the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) in Beijing and in Shanxi Province, 
which emphasized mixed financing responsibility among government, 
collectives, and individuals, with most of the responsibility falling on 
individuals. The pilots were followed in 1991 by (a) the State Council’s 
issuing Document 33, “Decision on Establishing a Unified Basic Old Age 
Insurance for Enterprise Employees,” which designated MOCA to take 
the lead on rural pensions and (b) MOCA’s launching pilots in five coun-
ties of Shandong Province.
A clear policy push occurred in the early 1990s to expand rural pen-
sion schemes. The various pilots contributed to a major policy document 
in 1992 from MOCA: “Basic Scheme for Rural Pension at County Level” 
(referred to hereafter as the Basic Scheme). The Basic Scheme was elabo-
rated on in a subsequent policy document in 1995,1 which outlined a set 
of basic principles for rural pension schemes while allowing for variations 
in specifics by localities:
• Schemes were to be voluntary, mainly financed from individual contri-
butions, supported by contributions from collectives at the village and 
township levels, and supported by preferential government policies 
(for example, tax relief for collectives on contributions). The Basic 
Scheme set the retirement age at 60 for both men and women, although 
in the practices that emerged, the retirement age for women was not 
uncommonly set at 55.
• Following the lead of the urban pension system reform, schemes were 
to be based on funded individual accounts.
• Individual contributions were to range from 2 to 20 yuan monthly with 
a matching 2 yuan contributed by the collective.
• Elderly farmers were entitled to receive a pension until death. In cases 
in which they lived fewer than 10 years after retiring, any balances in 
their individual accounts could be inherited.2
• Investments of accumulated contributions were to be made in bank 
deposits and national bonds; no direct investments were otherwise 
allowed. Although portfolio rules mandated low-return investments, in 
practice the system committed to a guaranteed rate of return. 
• The local Bureau of Civil Affairs would administer the scheme, and 
administrative costs would be covered from contributions (with a cap 
of 3 percent set subsequently).
• Oversight and regulation of the scheme were to sit largely with the 
implementing agency (that is, MOCA at the county level), subject to 
the internal controls of the Ministry of Finance and internal auditing. 
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As a result of this policy initiative, coverage of rural pensions expanded 
significantly during the 1990s, with programs established by the end of 
1998 in 31 provinces and 2,123 counties (just under three-quarters of all 
rural counties). This period was also the high point of coverage, with 
80.25 million rural worker participants and more than 600,000 pension 
beneficiaries. However, concerns soon began to emerge about the opera-
tion of local schemes and the lack of a sound governance framework; the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997 underscored the need to rethink the pro-
gram.3 Responsibility for rural pensions was subsequently switched from 
MOCA to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MOLSS; now the 
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security) in the 1998 adminis-
trative restructuring. 
Contraction and Stagnation: 1999–2002
Because of concerns about the effectiveness and sustainability of rural 
pension schemes, a sharp policy shift occurred in the late 1990s to limit 
their expansion. The change in the official position on rural pensions was 
reflected in the 1999 State Council declaration that China was not yet 
ready for universal rural pensions, which directed counties to (a) cease 
expanding schemes; (b) rectify the operations of existing schemes; and (c) 
when possible, transfer schemes to the management of commercial insur-
ers. By 2001, the shift in policy contributed to a sharp decline in coverage 
to just under 60 million participants, with the number stabilizing between 
50 million and 55 million through 2007 in roughly 1,900 counties. 
Despite this contraction, new participants continued to enter the system 
and accumulated funds from existing schemes continued to increase, 
more than doubling from 2000 to over 41 billion yuan in 2007. The 
number of pension beneficiaries approached 4 million by 2007 as existing 
schemes matured (see table 5.1). The variability of indicators over time 
is noteworthy, especially during the 1990s.
The development of the rural pension system during this phase was 
characterized by several deficiencies that undermined the achievement of 
policy objectives:
• Coverage was highly imbalanced geographically, with four coastal 
provinces (Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanghai, and Zhejiang) accounting for 
about 45 percent of total participation and 64 percent of total accumu-
lations. Poorer regions, in contrast, generally failed to attain significant 
penetration.
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• Although the policy indicated that participation was voluntary, local 
authorities in many cases mandated participation in the face of disin-
terest from farmers.
• Matching contributions from collectives were seldom made, and their 
incidence was highly skewed toward a small number of richer prov-
inces. The privatization of township and village enterprises in the 
1990s contributed to the lack of matching contributions from employ-
ers. As a result, 98.5 percent of matching contributions were concen-
trated in only five provinces (the four coastal provinces noted above 
plus Beijing).
• At the local level, concerns arose about the concentration of matching 
funds for cadre members rather than for all scheme members.4
• Compared with the urban scheme, in which administrative costs are 
borne by the government, the 3 percent administrative fee on rural 
schemes was deducted from farmer contributions, which was consid-
ered inequitable.
• Many schemes were unable to pay benefits in full, with at least 200 
counties cancelling schemes and contributors being unable to recoup 
Table 5.1 Rural Pension Indicators, 1993–2007
Year
Number of participants (millions)
Counties
Number of 
recipients 
(millions)
Accumulated 
funds (yuan, 
billions)
Year-end 
total 
New 
participants
New 
participants 
employed in 
township 
enterprises
1993 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,100 n.a. 1.48
1994 34.84 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.17 2.70
1995 51.43 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.27 5.95
1996 65.94 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.32 9.95
1997 74.52 n.a. n.a. 2,100 0.61 13.92
1998 80.25 n.a. n.a. 2,123 n.a. 16.62
1999 80.00 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2000 61.72 1.84 1.51 2,052 0.98 19.55
2001 59.95 3.12 0.92 2,045 1.08 21.61
2002 54.62 4.13 0.67 1,955 1.23 23.32
2003 54.28 2.24 1.40 1,870 1.98 25.93
2004 53.78 3.97 0.37 1,887 2.05 28.50
2005 54.42 2.34 0.29 1,990 3.02 31.00
2006 53.73 n.a. n.a. 1,905 3.55 35.40
2007 51.71 3.06 0.19 n.a. 3.91 41.20
Sources: NBS 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2006, 2004, 2003, 2002; Bulletins of Ministry of Civil Affairs (1993−97) and 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security (1998−2007).
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their contributions. Even when benefits continued to be paid, they 
were frequently significantly less than expected because of low returns 
on accumulations. Low returns stemmed partly from a preponderance 
of investments in bank deposits with very low interest rates. The reluc-
tance to invest in higher-return government securities was exacerbated 
by localized problems with fund management. As examples, Beijing 
and Hebei lost significant amounts of invested accumulations through 
the bankruptcy of fund management companies entrusted to invest in 
government securities.
• Supervision of schemes was weak. MOLSS figures for the end of 2000 
indicate that about 20 percent of accumulations had been invested in 
unauthorized assets, including real estate, stocks, enterprise bonds, and 
nonbank financial agencies. Although local implementers may have 
intended to increase returns and meet guaranteed return directives, 
their failure to abide by investment guidelines indicates significant 
regulatory issues. This failure was in part a structural problem because 
local implementers were under the direct authority of local govern-
ments, but the scheme, in principle, was under the bureau at a higher 
level. 
• The ratio of guaranteed rates of return, interest rates on investments, 
and inflation showed significant volatility, which contributed to signifi-
cant negative real returns on accumulations in some periods and the 
reverse in others (see table 5.2).
• Pension benefits were very low, with the average pension at about 85 
yuan per month in 2007. Moreover, benefits were highly variable across 
provinces and individuals. A general lack of confidence in schemes also 
Table 5.2 Rates of Return on Accumulations and Bank Deposits, Compared with 
Inflation Rate
percent
Indicator
Year.Month
1991.1 1993.5 1994.1 1997.1 1998.1 1998.7 1999.7 2007.1
Interest rate for 
accumulation 8.80 8.80 12.00 8.80 6.80 5.00 2.50 3.15
Interest rate—one
year’s deposit 
in bank
8.64 9.18 
(10.98 
July)
10.98 7.47 5.67 4.77 2.25 2.52 
(4.14 
year 
end)
Inflation rate 3.40 14.70 24.10 2.80 −0.80 −0.80 −1.40 4.80
Source: Wu 2009.
Evolution of the Rural Pension System in China       91
resulted in very small contributions in excess of the minimum by farm-
ers. For example, if farmers chose to contribute 2 yuan per month, their 
estimated pension after 15 years, in nominal terms, would have 
amounted to about 10 yuan per month (G. Wang 2000). Taking into 
account inflation and administrative costs, their real benefits would 
have been even less.
• The planned transfer of administration to labor bureaus was not under-
taken in a timely manner (or at all in some areas), with 350 counties 
not having transferred management by 2007.
Renewal: 2003–09
Renewed impetus toward a new rural pension system emerged in late 
2002 with the CPC Congress, which resulted in new guidelines from 
MOLSS (2003). This push was followed by (a) opinions of the Central 
Party Committee and the State Council at the end of 2005, which were 
part of the wider commitment to “building a new socialist countryside,” 
and (b) the 2006 plenary meeting of the 16th CPC, which committed the 
government to universal social insurance coverage by 2020. Between 
2003 and 2009, additional rural pension schemes developed, with more 
than 300 counties in 25 provinces establishing new schemes by the end 
of 2008.
The new rural pension schemes established during this period fall 
broadly into three types: (a) social pooling plus individual accounts, 
(b) flat universal pensions combined with individual accounts, and 
(c) individual accounts only. In addition, the schemes differed in the 
financing role of government at the accumulation and payout stages. 
As a result, five variants existed by 2009 when the new national pilot 
was announced (and into which such schemes should eventually be 
merged):5
• Flat pensions plus individual accounts with government financing at the 
payout stage only. Under this variant, individual contributions went to 
individual accounts, whereas the government financed flat pensions 
from general revenues. The most notable example of this model has 
been Beijing since 2005 (Beijing Municipal Government 2005). This 
variant was taken a step further in 2009 with further revision of the 
scheme to expand coverage of the rural pension to urban residents not 
covered by work-related urban schemes (Beijing Municipal Govern-
ment 2007, 2009).
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• Flat pensions plus individual accounts with government financing (a) by 
matching contributions to individual accounts and (b) at the payout stage 
through the financing of flat pensions from general revenues. This model 
has been observed, for example, in Baoji in Shaanxi Province since 2007 
(a city in which 74 percent of the population is farmers) and in Qian’an 
in Hebei Province. In large measure, this model is the precursor to the 
new national pilot structure.
• Individual accounts with social pooling with government financing at the 
accumulation phase. This model is similar to the urban employee pen-
sion system but with lower contributions and fewer benefits. This 
model has typically been implemented in regions with high urbaniza-
tion rates and good fiscal positions, such as Suzhou in Jiangsu Province 
since 2003 (in which 60 percent of the population is rural and a large 
proportion is migrant) (Suzhou Municipal Government 2003) and in 
Qingdao in Shandong Province.
• Individual accounts combined with social pooling with government financ-
ing (a) by matching contributions to individual accounts and (b) at the 
payout stage. This model has been implemented in Zhongshan and 
Dongguan.
• Individual accounts only with government matching for contributions to 
individual accounts. This model is the simplest design, although it lacks 
risk pooling of any form. It has been implemented in Yantai in Shan-
dong Province since 2005 (a city in which 58 percent of the population 
is farmers) (Yantai Municipal Government 2007) and in Hangshou in 
Zhejiang Province.
In addition to these most common models, other experiments with 
rural pensions have been conducted, including the “land for pensions” 
schemes. Wen Jiang County of Chengdu Prefecture, for example, allowed 
farmers to enter the urban pension system under the so-called two give-
ups approach, whereby farmers relinquish the management rights on 
their land and the use of the land on which they dwell. Similar approaches 
were taken in Chongqing and within Guangdong Province. Finally, 
schemes are being implemented for specific subgroups of farmers, par-
ticularly farmers whose land has been expropriated, and migrant workers 
in urban areas. This approach is common in areas experiencing rapid 
urbanization (even in less developed provinces, such as Ningxia) and 
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offers entitlements in the urban system as effective compensation for 
expropriated land.
The preceding discussion suggests a rich history of experimentation 
with rural pensions in China in the lead-up to the 2009 national pilot. 
Such experimentation is not surprising given the wider commitment of 
the Chinese authorities to balanced development and development of a 
rural social protection system. From this experience, a number of patterns 
and issues emerge, which are discussed below. They are useful in consid-
ering the ways in which the recent national pilot deals with various issues 
and has built on previous experience.
• Voluntary with incentives. In policy terms, all schemes have been volun-
tary, relying on a mixture of incentives to encourage participation. At 
the same time, a feature in a number of schemes (for example, in 
Suzhou and Baoji) has been the system of so-called family binding, 
whereby the pension eligibility of an older contributor close to retire-
ment age is determined by whether his or her spouse and all adult 
children contribute to the new system. Opinions differ among local 
commentators on the merits of this feature, although it has been 
adopted in the national pilot.6 Apart from this feature, the new rural 
pension schemes have been incentive driven through the subsidy 
mechanism, although some debate exists on the extent to which any 
program with sufficiently strong support from the local administration 
is truly “voluntary.” The incentive-based approach has resulted in exten-
sive coverage in a number of pilots. For example, Beijing’s participation 
rate rose from 37 percent to 85 percent following an increase in the 
subsidy level, whereas in Suzhou—where government contributions 
constitute 60 percent of the combined total—participation has reached 
99 percent. Examples like Baoji are more nuanced, with a 68 percent 
participation rate among all farmers, rising to 92 percent for farmers 
over 45 years of age.
• Retirement ages and contribution requirements. As noted, the prescribed 
retirement age under the former Basic Scheme was 60 for both sexes, 
and participation started at 20 years of age. The retirement age has 
varied at both ends under the new pilot schemes—with the entry age 
for participation as low as 16 in Beijing and 18 in Baoji (although it 
remains 20 in places such as Yantai) and the retirement age set at 55 for 
women and 60 for men in Beijing, at 59 for both sexes in Yantai, and 
with no upper age limit in Baoji. A clear issue here for localities seeking 
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to integrate urban and rural systems is the retirement ages in urban 
systems, which are typically 55 for women and 60 for men. 
Requiring a 15-year contribution history to qualify for full benefits 
under pilot schemes has been a widespread practice, with the obvious 
exception of individual account–only schemes, in which minimum 
contribution periods are irrelevant. However, a number of schemes 
recognize the transition issue and have incorporated special treatment 
for those older than 45. For example, Baoji has allowed a full pension 
for those over 45 if they contribute until age 60; those over 60 are also 
entitled, subject to “family binding” (a feature adopted in the new 
national pilot). Some schemes also made provisions for the lump-sum 
payment of contributions by those without a full contribution histo-
ry—in some cases at the point of retirement (for example, Beijing and 
Zhuhai) and in others during the accumulation phase. Other schemes 
have allowed older cohorts to continue to make contributions for up 
to five years after reaching the normal retirement age.
• Financing models and sustainability. A key feature of all the pilot schemes 
in this period was significant public subsidies, either for contributions 
to individual accounts or during the payout phase, or both. This feature 
represents a major shift and recognition by central and local authorities 
that some form of matching is necessary to incentivize participation by 
rural populations.7 This experience has also been addressed in part in 
the Chinese literature, and the need for public subsidies to support 
rural pension schemes is generally recognized.8 
Although the large majority of public subsidies have come from 
general revenues, some experiments with partial funding from dedi-
cated revenue streams have also been conducted. Zhuhai City pio-
neered this approach beginning in 2006 by allocating land transaction 
revenues to finance a reserve fund for incremental pensions and for 
those who exhaust their individual account accumulations.9
A major and still unresolved issue is the fiscal sustainability of dif-
ferent scheme designs. Simulations using government spending rang-
ing from 1.0 to 2.5 percent of general revenues have been conducted 
with different system parameters. These analyses indicate that a broad-
based rural pension system should be fiscally affordable and sustain-
able in the aggregate, although it remains to be seen whether the 
requisite financial commitment will be met.10 Initial reports using the 
government’s own projections indicate a cost of 1.8 percent of fiscal 
expenditures (about 66 billion renminbi) in 2008 for the central 
Evolution of the Rural Pension System in China       95
 government’s portion in the national pilot scheme. However, more 
work is needed. For example, rural mortality tables on a sufficiently 
disaggregated basis are needed and can be generated from census data. 
More important, clarity is needed on the financing responsibilities of 
subnational levels of government and the variable capacity of different 
levels to meet them.11 
• Contribution rates and benefit levels. As one would expect, the struc-
ture of these local pilots, their absolute levels of contributions, and 
their benefit levels have varied substantially. Most schemes for which 
information is available have designated a range for the contribution 
rate made to individual accounts, which is often linked to average 
wages or rural incomes. Baoji has had a range of 10 percent to 30 
percent of average rural income (and plans to lower the base to 5 
percent), whereas Beijing had a much wider range, from 9 percent of 
average rural incomes to 30 percent of average urban wages. Suzhou 
appears to have been an exception in this regard, with a flat contribu-
tion rate and base for all contributors (either 10 percent of the rural 
average income or 50 percent of the average urban income). Interest-
ingly, at least one Chinese scholar has raised the idea of farmers’ being 
allowed to make some contributions in grain—although no such 
example was found in the research for this report—whereas others 
have proposed allocating grain subsidies paid to farmers to rural pen-
sion schemes.12
With respect to benefits, an emerging practice is to pay close atten-
tion to the dibao level and fiscal sustainability when setting benefits for 
the flat pension portion of schemes. The general rule of thumb appears 
to be that flat pension benefits should be at or slightly above the aver-
age dibao threshold in the locality. Adding funded benefits is antici-
pated to take total pensions notably above the dibao level. This 
threshold may vary upward according to local fiscal capacity (for 
example, Beijing sets its flat pension portion at 35 percent of rural 
average income). For the individual account portion of schemes, the 
calculation of the payout has varied. For Beijing and Baoji, for example, 
the individual account benefit has been calculated by dividing the 
amount in the account at retirement by 139 (the same method that is 
used in their urban schemes—which reflects the combined assump-
tions of a notional life expectancy of 60 and an assumed drawdown 
interest rate of 4 percent; this method has also been adopted by the 
new national pilot). Although a similar approach has been taken 
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 elsewhere, the actuarial factor used in the calculation has varied (for 
example, Zhuhai has used a factor of 180, whereas Suzhou has used 
120). Such variable practice strongly suggests a need for work on rural 
mortality tables, ideally at a disaggregated level, to ensure that this 
portion of the benefit is not exhausted too early (or, more likely if 
urban mortality rates are being used, too late). 
• Institutional issues. The experience of local pilots in this period with 
respect to both scheme administration and fund management demon-
strates a degree of continuity, but regulation demands greater attention. 
Overall administration of new schemes has remained with the Social 
Security Bureau, with roles also for villages (collection of contributions 
and, in many cases, payment of benefits), townships (consolidation of 
collections, approval of benefits, and registration), and counties (for 
general oversight and scheme design). The computerization of scheme 
information systems also appears to have generally improved, even in 
less developed areas such as Baoji. Within this general administrative 
structure, a variety of local innovations in administration occur. For 
example, Suzhou farmers have been able to contribute directly through 
banks rather than through village officials, and post offices (including 
mobile facilities) are being used in areas with lower banking penetra-
tion. Some schemes have also allowed for the seasonality of farmer 
incomes, so that schemes such as that in Baoji have made collections 
only once a year in July or August. 
With respect to fund management, the Basic Scheme resources 
had been managed at the county level; and this practice has remained 
for local pilots after 2003. Some researchers have suggested the city 
as the appropriate level for fund management; others have proposed 
the provincial or even national levels (see C. Liu 2007; Z. Liu 2003; 
Lü 2005; and Z. Wang 2004). Portfolio rules have clearly continued 
to be very conservative (and remain so in the national pilot). Some 
researchers have proposed establishing reserve funds to cover low 
rates of return (although such funds are more typically used to 
address fluctuations in returns or the exhaustion of benefits because 
of longevity in funded systems). The concept of a reserve fund is, in 
principle, attractive, and actual practice, in places such as Zhuhai, 
suggests an interest.13 The more significant concern going forward is 
the regulation of the funded portion of the new national scheme. As 
discussed earlier, regulation was a significant weakness of the old 
schemes, and even in the mature urban schemes, it continues to be 
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an area in which the capacity of the system remains stretched (World 
Bank forthcoming a).
• Portability between schemes. A range of transition policies has been 
observed for schemes initiated in this period. The first type of transition 
is from old to new schemes in the same locality. Practice has differed: 
areas such as Beijing have allowed portability of funded accumulations 
from old to new schemes, whereas others, such as the province of 
Hunan, stipulate that participants must close their accounts in old 
schemes before starting afresh in new pilot schemes.14 The second (and 
ultimately more important) issue is portability between rural and urban 
schemes (or migrant-worker schemes located in urban areas where 
such schemes exist). Portability will be critical in reaching the govern-
ment’s stated goal of an integrated social security system by 2020. The 
ease with which portability can be achieved has varied according to 
scheme design and the compatibility of rural pilots with existing urban 
schemes. In Suzhou, for example, a simple two-to-one rule has been 
used for farmers wishing to transfer their social pooling rights from the 
rural to the urban scheme; such transfer is easily done because the rural 
contribution base has been exactly half that of the urban system. In 
Beijing, provisions for portability have also been made, although trans-
fer is only done at the point of retirement. If a former farmer has accu-
mulated enough years in the urban system at retirement, he or she will 
enjoy an urban pension (with an allowance for lower rural contribu-
tions), whereas his or her urban contributions will be credited to the 
rural pension scheme if the accumulation period in the urban system is 
fewer than 15 years. In all schemes, the funded portion is easily made 
portable, in principle.
• Interface of pensions and social assistance. The relationship of these local 
rural pension schemes to various social assistance benefits also merits 
consideration. The most interesting example is wubao, a social welfare 
benefit that guarantees an “average” standard of living for people in the 
so-called three-nos category (no income, no labor capacity, no sources 
of family support), in which the elderly appear to be significantly over-
represented.15 In some areas, such as Suzhou, wubao recipients have 
had their individual account benefits refunded. For rural dibao, indi-
viduals can receive both a pension and wubao (because the latter is a 
household-level benefit), which can result in the total household 
income falling below the local dibao line even with a pensioner in a new 
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scheme. Finally, pensions from local schemes have had no effect on the 
receipt of the supportive allowance for following family planning pol-
icy, although some Chinese researchers have proposed integrating the 
programs through the use of the family planning subsidy as an addi-
tional subsidy toward individual pension contributions (once partici-
pants are past child-bearing age) (see Mi and Yang 2008; C. Yang 2007; 
and Y. Yang 2007).
Looking Ahead: The Rural Pilot Program
Attention to the issue of rural pensions has shifted into high gear with the 
announcement in 2009 of a national rural pension pilot that started in late 
2009 and aims to achieve full geographic coverage no later than 2013 
(State Council 2009b). The diverse experience with rural pension schemes 
at the subnational level outlined earlier has offered important lessons for 
policy makers at the national level, which are reflected in significant mea-
sure in the design of the national pilot. The guiding principle of the pilot 
is basic insurance and wide coverage with flexibility and sustainability. The 
pilot started in 10 percent of counties nationwide in late 2009, with an 
initial aim of full geographic coverage in rural areas by 2020. However, the 
schedule has already been accelerated, with a target of 23 percent of coun-
ties to be included by the end of 2010 and the expectation that all coun-
ties will be covered by the end of 2012 (State Council 20011). Initial 
experience with take-up has been positive, with more than 36 million 
contributors enrolled in the first few months of implementation by 
Chinese New Year 2010 and approximately 13.4 million people already 
receiving pensions by that time. These numbers represent an estimated 
national participation rate of about 50 percent, with local participation 
rates as high as 80 to 90 percent in some areas, particularly those such 
as Baoji that already had mature pilots. Participation has continued to 
expand rapidly, with over 150 million contributors by mid-2011. The 
design has several key features:
• Participation by rural workers is voluntary.
• All rural residents over 16 years of age are eligible to participate if they 
are not already covered in a basic urban scheme. 
• Participants become eligible for a pension at 60 years of age.
• The scheme provides for individual pension accounts with matching 
contributions and a basic flat pension for workers who, in the mature 
system, will have contributed for 15 years. The initial value of the basic 
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pension is 55 yuan per month, which can be supplemented by local 
governments at their discretion from their own revenues. Individual 
accounts will have a rate of return equal to the one-year deposit interest 
rate of the People’s Bank of China; benefits will be computed by divid-
ing the accumulation at age 60 by 139 (as is done in the urban workers’ 
scheme). The indexation procedure for the basic pension is somewhat 
vague—to be set in accordance with “economic development and 
changing prices.”
• At the time the scheme is introduced, those over 60 years of age can 
receive the basic pension benefit, provided their children are contribut-
ing to the scheme (that is, “family binding”). Those with fewer than 15 
years left before reaching 60 should contribute during their working 
lives and can then make lump-sum contributions to make up any short-
fall in the vesting period of 15 years of contributions.
• Financing of the scheme will come from a combination of (a) central 
subsidies to support the basic pension (in full for central and western 
regions and 50 percent for eastern regions); (b) individual contributions 
(ranging from 100 to 500 yuan annually at the worker’s choice); (c) a 
partial match on the individual contribution by local governments of at 
least 30 yuan per year (independent of the contribution level chosen by 
the worker), or at a higher rate as shall be determined; and (d) collec-
tive subsidies, which are encouraged but not mandated, with no level 
specified. During the first months of implementation, contributors 
have most commonly chosen the 100- or the 500-yuan contribution 
levels. At the same time, some provinces and counties have allowed for 
considerably higher contribution levels from farmers of up to 2,500 
yuan in some coastal areas. 
• Fund management for individual account accumulations will begin at 
the county level, with the aim of shifting management to the provincial 
level as quickly as is feasible. Local offices of the Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security (MHRSS) will supervise funds.
The overall approach of the new pension pilot reflects a number of 
lessons from international experience and significantly improves on many 
earlier rural pension schemes. Matching individual account contribu-
tions—the so-called matching defined contribution, or MDC, approach—
sensibly recognizes the need for incentives for rural workers to participate 
in pension schemes. In addition, the introduction of a basic minimum 
benefit echoes the practice of a number of developed and developing 
countries that have introduced social pensions for the elderly, although 
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linking eligibility for the basic benefit to individual account contributions 
represents an important difference in approach. Finally, the role of central 
financing reflects lessons from other areas of social policy in China, 
including health insurance and dibao, which have clearly demonstrated 
the need for central subsidies to lagging regions if the equity objectives of 
coverage expansion are to be realized.
Although the objectives and broad design features of the rural pilot 
program have much to recommend them, a number of issues in the pro-
gram’s design may benefit from further consideration and closer evalua-
tion as the scheme is implemented. Addressing these issues could help 
improve incentives, equity, portability, and fund management. The fol-
lowing four issues are discussed further below:
• Contribution levels, the degree of subsidy, and participation incen-
tives
• Benefit eligibility and levels
• Fund management for the individual account part of the scheme
• Portability of benefits and system “dovetailing”
With respect to subsidies to incentivize participation, the current 
match of 30 yuan against the minimum 100-yuan annual contribution is 
low compared with emerging practices for MDCs in developing coun-
tries (where a one-to-one match is more common). The flat match also 
acts as a weak incentive for making contributions over the 100-yuan 
minimum, although it has merit from an equity perspective. A further 
complicating factor is that the assurance of a basic pension after the vest-
ing period of contributions acts as a significant incentive to participate. 
Overall, no international consensus exists yet on the appropriate match-
ing rate in MDC schemes. Thus, monitoring the pilot will be important 
to see whether the 30-yuan match is sufficient, both in incentivizing 
 participation at the basic 100-yuan contribution level and in incentiviz-
ing higher  individual contributions. This question can only be answered 
empirically.
The discussion of subsidies and incentives also raises the issue of the 
appropriate balance between ex ante subsidies (that is, the matching of 
individual account contributions) and ex post subsidies (that is, the provi-
sion of a basic pension benefit). Although the current emphasis on the ex 
post subsidy has the advantage of simplicity, it is less attractive for a 
mobile rural population. Once the system matures, rural workers who enroll 
in an urban scheme upon migration—or who intend to move—would not 
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benefit as greatly from the incentive effect of the ex post subsidy 
under the current design. This consideration may be important with 
an increasingly mobile and urbanizing population. Increasing the ex 
ante subsidy by increasing matching would lessen this possible disin-
centive effect. 
An obvious question raised by a shift in the balance of public subsidies 
from ex post to ex ante is its effect on the poverty alleviation objective 
of the basic rural pension. If greater public subsidies were shifted ex ante, 
maintaining a neutral fiscal effect would require a lower basic pension in 
a situation in which the 55-yuan benefit is already below the rural pov-
erty line and could reduce the basic benefit below the average dibao level, 
which has additional negative incentive effects. Such a shift could be 
addressed in at least two ways. First, a partial benefit reduction of the 
basic benefit for individuals over a certain income threshold may be pos-
sible to protect the benefit level for poorer elderly people.16 Second, the 
local administrative level may be able to supplement the basic benefit to 
ensure that it exceeds the local dibao level. 
A second issue that merits consideration relates to fund management. 
The initial approach of allowing fund management at the county level has 
a range of drawbacks, including investment risk and the risk of accounts 
being in practice “empty.” Such localized management complicates pro-
viding portability of account balances for rural workers who move beyond 
their home counties. In addition, the demographic trends in rural areas 
suggest that a sizable reserve fund will likely be necessary in the rural 
system, the management of which is best done at higher levels.
In addition to the drawbacks of subprovincial fund management, using 
the one-year deposit rate of interest as the rate of return for individual 
accounts will likely prove problematic over time (as has been the case for 
urban schemes). Although very secure, such a low rate virtually guaran-
tees a low individual account balance at retirement and thus weakens 
participation incentives for rural workers. Even given the appropriate 
desire to limit investment risk, other approaches, such as notional defined 
contribution schemes, can in principle address this objective while still 
providing an adequate rate of return.
The following specific elements of eligibility for the scheme would 
benefit from being closely monitored and reviewed over time:
• Retirement age of 60. For the present, this requirement is sensible in its 
alignment with the urban scheme. At the same time, the aging of 
China’s population will demand the upward adjustment of retirement 
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ages over time; such adjustment should be considered sooner rather 
than later by both rural and urban systems. A pressing need exists for 
reliable—and periodically updated—rural mortality tables to assess 
the appropriateness of the coefficient of 139 in the drawdown phase 
of individual account balances. The coefficient is aligned with that 
used by the urban system but should, in principle, be fine-tuned to 
line up with rural mortality trends. 
• Policies for vulnerable groups for whom local governments are expected to 
pay partial or full individual account contributions. The State Council 
document leaves this issue open, referring to groups “with paying dif-
ficulties . . . like those with serious disabilities” (State Council 2009b). 
Given the importance of the principle of equity underlying this provi-
sion, development of a better-defined common policy for people for 
whom contributions should be made (and in what amounts) would be 
useful. Apart from those with disabilities, for example, adults in dibao 
households would appear to be included under this provision. Practice 
appears quite mixed; some areas contribute on behalf of dibao house-
holds, in whole or in part, whereas other areas have adopted narrower 
categories of eligibility.17 Considering whether the central government 
should fund—or partly fund—such contributions, perhaps together 
with local authorities, would also be useful. Although central funding 
raises the risk that local-level authorities will game the system, that risk 
could presumably be controlled through clear guidelines on eligible 
populations and would obviate the risk of excluding poor people in 
fiscally constrained localities.
• Eligibility of workers with rural hukou who reside in urban areas but are 
not enrolled in the urban pension system.18 In principle, the scheme allows 
workers with rural hukou to participate and to receive local and central 
subsidies even when residing in cities (a modern-day example of nong 
cun bao wei cheng shi, “the countryside encircling the cities”). In moni-
toring implementation, attention should be given to see how this ele-
ment plays out, and the policy interactions with emerging urban resi-
dents’ pension schemes should be studied. Although the current 
residence of workers (rather than hukou) should, of course, not affect 
the central subsidy, the incentives are questionable for local authorities 
to (a) match individual account contributions and (b) supplement the 
basic pension benefit for workers with local rural hukou who do not 
currently reside in the rural locality.
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The policy anticipates but does not clearly address the portability of 
pension rights under the new scheme. This issue is important and should 
be addressed soon. Portability of vested rights and individual account 
balances—both across rural areas and between rural and urban schemes—is 
important given China’s increasingly mobile labor force. The recent docu-
ment (State Council 2009c) on the portability of rights within the urban 
enterprise system suggests that the issue has been recognized. Ensuring 
that portability (both in policy and in practice) in the new rural scheme 
is aligned with emerging practices in the urban scheme is essential if the 
new scheme is to achieve its social security and labor market objectives. 
In practical terms, portability will require the rapid development of sys-
tems to reliably transfer information and funds across localities.
The implementation of the scheme will face four key challenges (on 
which the MHRSS is already focusing):
• Capacity at local levels, particularly at the county level and below. The 
massive and very rapid expansion of the system will place demands on 
local-level implementation and delivery capacity. These demands will 
present real challenges in many areas, particularly in service delivery for 
participants and beneficiaries. The government’s intention is to intro-
duce rural social security service centers at least down to (and ideally 
below) the county level. However, existing staffing ratios imply service 
loads in an expanding system well above those one would typically 
observe internationally for similar schemes. At the same time, interest-
ing experiences are emerging from initial partnerships with the banking 
sector that are helping spread the administrative burden of managing 
client contributions and basic record keeping (for example, in Ping 
Yuan County in Guangdong Province). 
• Establishing information systems required to support the new program 
and linking them to related programs, such as the New Cooperative 
Medical Scheme, and to other localities. The government’s stated 
intention is to extend the systems to grassroots levels, although 
implementation presents challenges for both the systems’ capacities 
and personnel training. Moreover, it risks fragmentation of informa-
tion systems if not closely managed (although the standardized soft-
ware from the MHRSS should help in promoting greater coherence 
than has been observed in urban schemes). The challenge of inte-
grating information systems is likely to be more acute in provinces 
where management of the New Cooperative Medical Scheme and 
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the new rural pension scheme remains divided between the Minis-
try of Health and the MHRSS. 
• Penetration of financial and banking services in rural areas and the effect 
of implementing the scheme on payment systems and the systems of collec-
tions for contributions. The MHRSS is working actively on this issue in 
cooperation with national banks for better rural coverage (one exam-
ple of such a partnership is with the Postal Savings Bank), but even 
banks with extensive coverage do not have branches in all townships 
(an estimated 7 percent of townships do not yet have a bank). The 
roles for nonbank financial institutions and reliance on mobile banking 
may merit further exploration (Pickens, Porteous, and Rotman 2009).
• The level of contribution matching for individual accounts across counties 
(which raises issues of equity). The obvious challenge is avoiding a situa-
tion in which poor counties fail to match individual account contribu-
tions (resulting in lower accumulations for the poor) while still maintain-
ing enough local interest in the scheme to encourage accountability at the 
county level. Initial experience suggests that different balances are being 
struck. In some provinces (for example, Mongolia and Ningxia), the 
province has been financing the match, whereas in others (for example, 
Shandong), the aim is to have the counties entirely finance the match.
As stated earlier, the new rural pension pilot has many positive and 
innovative features. At the same time, although the scheme relies on a 
broadly sensible design and represents a milestone in social policy in 
China, the preceding discussion of issues identifies scope for improve-
ment and further refinement of some policy parameters if China’s objec-
tives are to be fully attained. 
In addition to the new rural pension pilot, experience is growing with 
“urban resident” pension schemes, designed along similar lines to the rural 
pension pilot. The potential dovetailing of these schemes and those for 
rural workers over time is another emerging issue in pension policy. In 
cities with sufficient fiscal capacity, a recent rapid expansion in local 
schemes offers residents outside the urban workers’ scheme a combina-
tion of an individual account and a basic pension. In some cases (for 
example, Hangzhou), local authorities match individual account contri-
butions, whereas in others (for example, Beijing), no such match occurs. 
In rapidly expanding areas, such schemes have already been merged with 
ongoing rural schemes to achieve an integrated residents’ pension scheme; 
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in a number of cases, benefit levels are equivalent between participants 
with urban hukou and those with rural hukou from the prefecture. Like 
the rural pension pilot, such initiatives seem promising as vehicles for 
expanding pension coverage to the nonwage sector and for promoting the 
vision laid out by policy makers of rural-urban integration. 
Conclusion
The experience reviewed in this chapter suggests a number of areas that 
will require particular attention from national policy makers as they imple-
ment the national pilot and continue to develop the national policy frame-
work for rural pensions. These areas include (a) the appropriate split 
between the central government and subnational levels on financing roles; 
(b) portfolio rules and balancing protection of pension investments against 
the need for adequate returns to increase the real value of  pensions; 
(c) issues of regulation and oversight that continue to remain weak; (d) treat-
ment of the population over 45 years of age, who will have  insufficient 
contribution histories under regular rules; (e) a close  examination of appro-
priate retirement ages based on updated rural  mortality  information; 
(f) transition and portability issues between old rural schemes and new 
schemes, and between rural and urban schemes; and (g) specific financing 
options, such as buffer funds, to deal with an aging rural  population.
The next chapter considers possible directions for evolution of the 
national rural pension pilot in the medium term, acknowledging the many 
positive features of the pilot. As discussed in this chapter, the national pilot 
is a milestone in the development of the rural social protection system in 
China. As it is rolled out, review of whether further refinements are desir-
able, in particular those related to universality of coverage of the basic 
benefit and the relative incentive roles of the individual account and the 
basic benefits, will be useful. The following chapter discusses these issues, 
offering proposals for consideration.
Notes
 1. In October 1995, the State Council redistributed a MOCA circular, “Further 
Improving the Rural Pension Insurance.”
 2. The pension benefit calculation formula was (0.008631526) * (accumulation 
in individual account).
 3. See P. Chen (2002), Liang (1999), Ma (1999), and Shi (2006) for a discussion 
of the shortcomings of previous rural pension schemes. 
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 4. See Peng (1996) for examples of massive differences in the matching of cadre 
and farmer contributions under local schemes.
 5. For detailed descriptions of the systems of Baoji, Beijing, Suzhou, and Yantai, 
see Wu (2009). For a detailed discussion of the Baoji pilot rural pension expe-
rience, see Zhang and Dan (2008).
 6. See Zhang and Dan (2008), who argue that such a system will encourage 
family disputes, whereas Sun (2006) considers such a system to be a prag-
matic and innovative approach to addressing individuals with short contribu-
tion histories.
 7. For a comprehensive discussion of recent experiences with “closing the cover-
age gap” through the extension of pension systems to rural and informal sec-
tor populations, see Holzmann, Robalino, and Takayama (2009); see Palacios 
and Robalino (2009) on the framework for matching defined contribution 
schemes.
 8. See Lin (2006) for European, Commonwealth of Independent States, and 
low-income countries; Gong (2006) for Japan; Su (2007) for the Republic of 
Korea; and Leisering, Sen, and Hussain (2002) and Zheng (2007) for a general 
discussion of the subsidy approach.
 9. See Zhuhai City, “Transitional Pension Method for Farmers and Land-
Expropriated Farmers,” as described by Wu (2009). Along similar lines, Donghua 
Wang (2006) has suggested that income from the auction of land-use rights and 
resources from state-owned assets should also be used for such purposes.
10. See Y. Chen (2004) and Dong (2008). The assumptions underlying these 
simulations merit note. For example, Chen used a projection model based on 
data from Jiangsu Province and assumes that one-quarter of the increase in 
general revenues would be needed for rural pension subsidies to support a 
universal pension for men and women at age 60 and 55, respectively. 
Assuming this subsidy represents 2.5 percent of general revenues, a universal 
farmers’ pension of 825 yuan annually could have been provided in 2010.
11. See Y. Chen (2004) and Qin (2007) for approaches to allocating financing 
responsibility among levels.
12. See Mi and Yang (2008) on the grain payment proposal, supported by a sur-
vey in Anhui Province that found that about one-fifth of rural respondents 
would prefer to make contributions in grain. See Lu (2004) and Zhan (2004) 
for proposals for the allocation of grain subsidies to farmers.
13. See L. Zhang (2007) regarding a reserve fund proposal. See Lü (2005) for 
proposals for higher-return portfolio options.
14. See http://www.cnr.cn/china/gdgg/201009/t20100907_507012375.html.
15. See World Bank (forthcoming b) for a discussion of social assistance 
 benefits in rural areas. Roughly 5.3 million people received wubao nation-
wide in 2007.
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16. Chile provides an example of such an approach. 
17. The possible coverage of dibao household contributions raises secondary 
questions about how to subsequently treat rural pension income in the dibao 
eligibility determination process, because the marginal cost of pension 
receipts could easily outweigh benefits once both the loss of the dibao ben-
efits and the attendant noncash benefits that attach to dibao receipt are taken 
into account.
18. Hukou is the residence permit system in China, which assigns the permit 
largely according to place of birth and the residence status of one’s parents.
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C H A P T E R  6
Issues for the Evolution of the 
Rural Pension System
Building on the national rural pension pilot, this chapter outlines issues 
for further development of the rural pension system over the medium 
term. As noted in the previous chapter, the national pension pilot is an 
exciting and positive development in expanding pension coverage to the 
rural population. At the same time, as the system evolves, opportunities 
for further adjustments in policy may arise to realize the government’s 
objectives over the longer term. This chapter lays out ideas as well as 
relevant international experience for Chinese policy makers to consider 
as they continue to refine the rural pension system.1 Several key issues 
are addressed:
• The appropriate level of the matching subsidy on individual accounts 
and its role relative to the basic pension benefit with regard to incen-
tives to participate in the scheme
• Individual account contributions and options for reducing the prob-
lem of low rates of return that have been seen in the urban funded 
system
• Whether the basic pension benefit in the national pilot should in time 
evolve into a “social pension” in which coverage does not depend on 
contributions
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• The interaction between the funded portion of the rural pension sys-
tem and the basic benefit in the longer term
• Prospects for eventual integration of rural pensions and urban “resi-
dents’ pension” schemes
Pension System Design Principles
Both in China and internationally, general agreement exists that an 
effective and sustainable pension scheme should have the following 
attributes:
• Adequacy. The benefit levels provided should be sufficient to perform 
the most basic function of promoting security in old age.
• Breadth. The system should provide basic protection to the vast major-
ity of workers and retirees (that is, it should have broad coverage), 
offering the possibility of saving for retirement and life-cycle consump-
tion smoothing, including individuals without stable income.
• Sustainability. The system design needs to be robust in the face of 
shocks and demographic trends (the latter is of special concern in 
China, as was noted earlier).
• Affordability. The government, individuals, and employers should be 
able to afford the system, both in a strict financial sense and, more 
broadly, at a level that does not inhibit labor market efficiency and the 
economic competitiveness of enterprises.
• Multiple layers. Although perhaps not as axiomatic as the preceding 
principles, international experience strongly points to the benefits of 
diversification of risks during the accumulation and decumulation 
phases of a pension system, thereby contributing to benefit predict-
ability.
Issues Regarding the Individual Account
The Matching Subsidy
Offering a matching subsidy in the national scheme represents a major 
shift and recognition by authorities that incentives are needed to attract 
the participation of rural populations (a lesson that also has relevance for 
urban nonwage populations). The policy direction is also consistent with 
experience in many member countries of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and in a number of middle-
income countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, as discussed later in this 
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chapter.2 The Chinese literature has addressed the need for incentives, 
and the move toward public subsidies for rural pensions has generally 
been supported.3
Determining the appropriate matching rate by the public sector (and 
hence the fiscal cost of the match) is not straightforward; the perfor-
mance of the new scheme should be closely monitored to select the most 
appropriate match. This determination will depend on several factors, 
including available resources, the elasticity of take-up against different 
rates of matching (see below for an illustration of this relationship), and 
the interaction of the contributory system with other forms of public 
transfers for the elderly. Despite widespread matching for fully funded 
pension schemes, virtually no robust evidence exists to relate matching 
rates with participation rates. Too low a match will create an insufficient 
incentive for participation. Too high a match will create a large fiscal 
burden and is poorly targeted with regard to poverty alleviation because 
everyone will benefit from the match, including those who are compara-
tively well-off. A related question is whether the match should vary as a 
function of the level of individual contributions or should be flat, perhaps 
based on some share of average rural income or urban wages in the area. 
This may invoke a trade-off between equity and fiscal concerns on one 
hand and the relative strength of incentives to contribute more than the 
minimum rate on the other. The evidence on saving behavior in China 
suggests that concerns about incentivizing saving for retirement may be 
less acute than they are in many countries, thus strengthening the justifi-
cation for focusing on the lower end of the distribution. 
Although no strong evidence exists to suggest an optimal matching 
defined contribution (MDC) matching rate, simulations are instructive. 
Palacios and Robalino (2009) estimate that an MDC approach can be 
cost-effective provided that (a) the take-up rate matching elasticity is not 
too low (below approximately 0.15) and (b) the individual contribution 
rates are not too low (below approximately 5 percent of average earnings). 
Overall, the study posits that (a) matching rates that are too low could 
cost more in the long run than do social pensions and that (b) “too low” 
could be below 0.50 or even one to one (Palacios and Robalino 2009). 
These findings must be interpreted with caution, however, because much 
of the evidence on matching comes from voluntary urban enterprise 
occupational schemes and the 401(k) experience in the United States 
(see figure 6.1). However, the findings raise questions about whether the 
current level of matching in the national rural pension pilot will be suf-
ficient to sustain incentives for younger workers to participate.
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Apart from the total amount (or rate) of the match, a clear decision 
should be made on which level of the system should fund matching con-
tributions for individual accounts. From an equity standpoint—and, in 
insurance terms, to promote a higher level of risk pool—the higher in the 
system the match’s source, the better. However, this decision must be bal-
anced against both the practicalities of matching in an environment in 
which contributions will vary across and within provinces (and hence 
potentially complex for the national government to determine the match-
ing funds or to demand a flat match that would result in variable incen-
tives across space) and the objectives of the central government that may 
place more weight on the flat portion of a future scheme. In this light, the 
recommendation is that matching funds come from the provincial level 
or below, or possibly some mix of the two, with the province providing a 
“floor match” of some agreed-on flat amount and localities supplementing 
it if they are able and willing. 
Another important question is whether to mandate that employers 
and collectives contribute to matching individual contributions in 
cases in which such an employment relationship exists. Although such 
Figure 6.1 Take-up Rate and Matching Contributions
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contributions may well be desirable in principle—and would provide 
closer parallels with the urban worker pension scheme—experience of 
previous rural schemes suggests that such a requirement may not be 
realistic.4 The rural pension pilot allows such contributions but does 
not rely on them to the degree that some schemes have in the past.
Investment and Management of Individual Accounts
The rules governing the investment of accumulations will have important 
repercussions for the level of income replacement the individual account 
will provide. Experience thus far with rural and urban pension schemes 
in China suggests that investment of accumulations is a key vulnerability 
in a scheme’s ability to provide adequate benefits at retirement. At this 
point, an appropriate governance and investment management frame-
work for rural or urban residents’ pensions is lacking. Low and volatile 
returns on contributions in rural pension schemes have been one of their 
greatest weaknesses to date, a vulnerability shared by China’s funded 
urban schemes. The People’s Bank of China requires investments to be 
made in one-year time deposits, which have generated low real returns 
over the past decade (on the order of 1−2 percent annually in the urban 
individual account system), far less than both rural and urban income 
growth. At the same time, policy makers are understandably reluctant to 
expose rural and urban nonwage populations to significant investment 
risk, given their general lack of financial sophistication and the underde-
veloped state of governance. 
The key determinant of the real value of the individual account por-
tion of the pension will be the rate of return earned on contributions 
during the accumulation phase. Figure 6.2 presents a simulation of the 
benefit level from an individual account based on a total annual contri-
bution of 360 renminbi (RMB) in present-value terms (that is, just under 
three times the current minimum combined contribution from the indi-
vidual plus a government match) and based on the following assump-
tions: (a) the scheme is launched in 2010, (b) rural mortality remains 
unchanged, (c) the retirement age is increased to 65, (d) benefits are 
price indexed, (e) the real discount rate is 2.5 percent, and (f) the wedge 
between real rate of return and real wage growth is −1.0 percent over 
the first 10 years and 1.0 percent afterward. Figure 6.2 shows the rela-
tively modest individual account accumulation that will likely result 
under this set of plausible assumptions with a retirement age that is nota-
bly higher than that currently adopted in the national rural pension pilot. 
Of course, the national pilot’s total replacement rate will not be based 
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solely on benefits paid from individual accounts. But the example under-
scores the importance of ongoing consideration of the total replacement 
rates the authorities will seek from their rural pilot and urban residents’ 
schemes and the contribution toward the level of income replacement 
that can realistically be expected from individual accounts under the cur-
rent minimum required contributions and government match.
An alternative—and, in the view of this book, preferred—approach 
would be for the central government to provide a guaranteed rate of 
return on the individual accounts. The guaranteed rate of return could be 
set at the national growth rate of the gross domestic product (GDP). This 
approach would offer a workable compromise between the competing 
objectives of security and adequacy of returns.
Although it may be too complicated at this stage, an option for the 
future would be to allow different investment rules for different cohorts 
of workers participating in the individual account scheme. For older 
workers, having conservative investment rules makes sense because it 
limits exposure to market risk and volatility and takes account of their 
lower degree of financial literacy. However, for younger workers, the com-
pounded effects of rules for low rates of return on conservative invest-
ments are likely to be large, and their extended contribution histories will 
Figure 6.2 Present Value of Individual Account Monthly Benefit by Years of 
Contributions Given a 360 RMB Total Annual Contribution
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allow for averaging market volatility across the life cycle. The authorities 
might consider using age-based portfolio default rules, which allow more 
aggressive investment for younger contributors that gradually becomes 
more conservative over the life cycle to focus on preserving the value of 
accumulations at retirement. 
Another question that merits consideration is whether a reserve fund 
is desirable. The answer depends in part on the intended long-term role 
of the basic pension benefit and any future social pension for the elderly. 
Such funds are more typically used to address fluctuations in returns or 
the exhaustion of benefits because of longevity. In principle, the concept 
of a reserve fund is attractive, and practice in places such as Zhuhai indi-
cates interest.5 
Management of funds in individual accounts and the appropriate 
level of the system for management also merit consideration. Current 
pilot schemes and past practice have generally involved management at 
the county level. However, combining funds from localities into a single 
pool that can be managed at higher levels to generate economies of 
scale in fund management has clear benefits. China’s experience with 
rural pensions cautions against localized management and investment of 
accumulations. A sensible option would be to have the National Social 
Security Fund (NSSF) manage funds in rural individual accounts, 
although considerable preparation would be required for the infrastruc-
ture to record and remit balances to the NSSF and to make transfers 
back to paying authorities as the system matures. More specifically, the 
new scheme could put the public subsidy for individual accounts into 
the NSSF and put contributions in the Agricultural Bank of China, the 
Postal Savings Bank, or other suitable financial institutions, with a uni-
form interest rate announced nationally and recorded in individual 
account passbooks. Although the option of contracting fund manage-
ment to authorized asset managers might be considered in the longer 
run, it would require a much stronger regulatory and accountability 
framework than exists presently.6 
With respect to the regulation of funded rural pension schemes, capac-
ity is presently inadequate; lack of capacity has been an ongoing weakness 
of rural schemes in China (see World Bank forthcoming; Wu 2009). In 
addition, existing capacity to regulate even urban schemes is stretched. 
Thus, rather than creating new institutions for regulating funded rural 
pensions, strengthening capacity in existing urban institutions to expand 
coverage to rural areas would seem more desirable. Taking such an 
approach would also help achieve critical mass in regulatory capacity. 
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For the credibility and utility of the individual account in the medium 
term, permitting account holders to borrow a portion of their account 
accumulations at a specified interest rate and with legally binding repay-
ment conditions is probably desirable. Eligible conditions might include 
the purchase of a home, certain types of health care costs, or costs for 
children’s education. In some systems, including 401(k) accounts in the 
United States, such “borrowings” are repaid at a designated interest rate 
by the individual. In other schemes, loans simply reduce the total accu-
mulated balance. Given the volatility of nonwage incomes and the eco-
nomic conditions of residents who work outside the formal sector, the 
opportunity to borrow from one’s individual accounts would be an 
attractive feature of the scheme; the structure of such a feature should be 
considered, ensuring, of course, that an adequate minimum accumulation 
will be available at retirement.
Rules for payouts must be developed. The options include annuitiza-
tion, phased withdrawal, and lump-sum payouts. Previous rural schemes 
have used phased withdrawal, which would be adequate for the foresee-
able future, but authorities should look toward eventually providing 
annuities instead. The lump-sum option, however, will likely be impor-
tant for the transitional generation (which is discussed further below). 
Some previous rural schemes in China provided for the lump-sum 
repayment of contributions to those without full contribution histories. 
In some cases, repayment was made at the point of retirement (for 
example, in Beijing and Zhuhai); in others, repayment was made during 
the accumulation phase. Other schemes have given older cohorts the 
option of continuing to contribute for up to five years after reaching the 
normal retirement age. 
Notional or Fully Funded Accounts for the Individual Account?
A bigger-picture question on the individual account portion of the rural 
pension scheme is whether the funding of public subsidies for individual 
accounts should be actual or notional.7 If investment of accumulations is 
restricted to bank deposits at fixed interest rates—which has been the 
case in urban schemes and most rural pilots to date—the more funda-
mental question is whether funded individual accounts or notional 
defined contribution (NDC) accounts are the preferred approach. The 
relative attraction of actual versus notional funding depends on a few key 
factors. The first is the investment rules for the individual account 
(including consideration of possible guarantees for rates of return), which 
were discussed earlier. If investments are constrained to fixed-interest 
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deposits in public sector banks, the effective difference between funded 
schemes and NDC schemes is significantly reduced. Second, the policy 
choices for the future of the urban system may be relevant, given the 
government’s desire for greater harmonization of urban and rural pension 
systems over time. If the urban system moves to an NDC design at some 
point, the attraction of notional funding for subsidies on individual 
accounts for the rural scheme increases. Counterbalancing these factors, 
however, are two significant issues that are specific to rural individual 
accounts. First, farmers lack awareness of the NDC concept and have a 
natural skepticism toward past scheme performance based on the prom-
ises of rural pension schemes that are not funded—“real money” would 
be a more intuitive concept for farmers. Second, and even more impor-
tant from a structural viewpoint, the demographic transition in rural areas 
in the coming decades would argue against an NDC approach. On bal-
ance, therefore, pursuing a fully funded approach to the individual 
account, as is being done under the national pilot scheme, makes sense.
Portability between Schemes
Transition issues will become important as the national rural pension 
scheme matures. The first type of transition is from old to new rural pen-
sion schemes within the same locality. Practice in China has varied, with 
areas such as Beijing allowing portability of funded accumulations from 
old to new schemes, whereas others, such as the province of Hunan, 
stipulate that participants must close their accounts in old schemes 
before starting afresh in new pilots.8 The national scheme appears to 
allow transfers of balances from prior schemes. The second (and ulti-
mately more important) issue is portability between rural and urban 
schemes (or migrant-worker schemes located in urban areas where they 
exist). Portability will be critical to reaching the government’s stated goal 
of an integrated social security system by 2020. The ease of portability 
has varied according to scheme design and the compatibility of rural 
pilots with existing urban schemes. Suzhou, for example, has had a simple 
two-to-one rule for farmers wishing to transfer their social pooling rights 
from the rural to the urban scheme; transfer is easily done because the 
rural contribution base has been exactly half that of the urban system. 
Beijing has also had provisions for portability, although it occurs only at 
the point of retirement. If a former farmer has accumulated enough years 
in the urban system at retirement, he or she will enjoy an urban pension 
(with an allowance for lower rural contributions), whereas his or her 
urban contributions will be credited to the rural pension scheme if the 
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accumulation period in the urban system is fewer than 15 years. In prin-
ciple, in all schemes, the funded portion can easily become portable. 
Because the MDC design adopted in the national rural pilot has no social 
pooling, apportionment is not an issue. 
Having a funded portion in the rural pension system may be useful for 
rural workers who move either to other rural areas without hukou or to 
urban areas. In principle, transferring balances from one scheme to 
another in the funded portion through totalization agreements between 
schemes should be straightforward. This approach raises the question, 
however, of whether to also consider pooling urban and rural accumula-
tions in the provinces and combining fund management. Such an 
approach has merit, although it may require greater coordination than is 
possible in the short run.
The issue of portability raises a host of design and implementation 
questions that will need to be closely considered during the pilot phase 
of the rural pension system. When a worker moves, will the funds in his 
or her account move or will only his or her contribution records move? 
How will the system account for accumulations in the rural system 
when workers move to the urban system? Finally, are pensions paid 
from various locations or from a single payment authority? These sorts 
of practical questions raise issues for record keeping, communication 
and information exchange between systems, and exchange of account 
information. In principle, standardized record-keeping and reporting 
formats for the new rural pension system (which have been developed 
and are being disseminated by the Ministry of Human Resources and 
Social Security) should be capable of addressing such practical ques-
tions. The harmonization of fund transfer and pension disbursement 
procedures would also be required. Again, some degree of centralization 
would be desirable to lessen administrative demands at the lower levels, 
although centralization might occur at the provincial level within national 
guidelines. These issues will require elaborated guidance from the central 
authorities over time.
International Experience with MDCs9
The MDC approach is relatively new but is being explored in a number 
of developing countries. Many OECD countries provide tax incentives 
to encourage workers and employers to contribute to voluntary private 
pension schemes. Most OECD countries provide incentives of at least 10 
percent of contributions—the average is around 20 percent—although 
this provision is made through tax deductions for employers on such 
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contributions (Yoo and de Serres 2004). In the United States, for exam-
ple, the value of forgone tax revenue for such deductions is equivalent to 
1 percent of GDP. Evidence shows that such programs increase participa-
tion, although the composition of savings is affected rather than its over-
all level. What seems clearer is that tax exemptions increase saving among 
low-income people and others with low saving rates (Benjamin 2003; 
Engen and Gale 2000). However, given progressive tax scales in most 
OECD countries, subsidies tend to benefit better-off workers dispropor-
tionately in absolute terms. In any event, using tax exemptions to subsi-
dize pension contributions would likely prove less effective in developing 
countries, where the poor are less likely to be subject to taxes in the first 
place and where distributional concerns on the use of public subsidies 
may be more pressing. In China, a tax exemption would be meaningless 
for the large majority of rural workers because their incomes are below 
the minimum personal income tax threshold. Because the majority of 
rural workers do not pay income tax, the direct match approach is pre-
ferred. That option is precisely the one chosen by the Chinese authorities 
in the national pilot, and it seems appropriate.
Experience with MDCs in developing countries is limited. Legislation 
introducing MDC schemes has been passed in the Dominican Republic, 
Indonesia, and Vietnam, but they have not yet been implemented. A 
noteworthy example comes from the Indian states of Rajasthan and 
Madhya Pradesh, both of which have MDC pension schemes for certain 
categories of informal sector workers. The schemes provide a one-to-one 
match on contributions from the state governments. Funds are invested 
by contracted asset managers with no guaranteed rate of return for con-
tributors. The state of Andhra Pradesh started a similar scheme in 2009 
that targeted women in self-help groups, with a subsidy of about US$10 
per year per person, which is expected to produce a pension just above 
the poverty line. The oldest such MDC scheme in India is in West Bengal, 
which has provided a one-to-one match for roughly 60 categories of 
informal sector workers since the early 2000s. The Indian government is 
considering an MDC approach for informal workers on a nationwide 
basis under its new pension scheme (see box 6.1).
As is the case for all defined contribution schemes, the design of 
MDCs needs to address two policy issues: (a) how to handle the death 
or disability of contributors, and (b) how to manage financial risk for 
contributors (particularly those with low financial literacy). With respect 
to the former, pure defined contribution schemes do not, by construc-
tion, provide insurance against premature death or disability during the 
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accumulation phase. As a result, group life and disability insurance poli-
cies are common for contributors in the scheme. Such policies would 
cover the difference between the individual’s account accumulation at 
the point of death or disability and the benefits paid under the policy in 
the event of death or disability. The premium is calculated using actuarial 
statistics for the group. Managing financial risk is handled differently in 
different countries, ranging from imposing conservative portfolio rules 
(which is the case in China now) to guaranteeing rates of return to trans-
ferring all risk to contributors (which is the case in the Indian schemes 
Box 6.1
Rajasthan’s Vishwakarma MDC Pension Scheme
In 2007, the government of Rajasthan, India, introduced an MDC scheme for 
20 categories of low-income workers, almost all of whom are in the informal sec-
tor. To be eligible, workers must (a) be residents of Rajasthan, (b) be between 18 and 
50 years of age, and (c) not be covered by any other provident fund arrangement 
supported by the government or an employer. If workers contribute 100 Indian 
rupees (just over US$2) per month for at least 10 months each year, the state gov-
ernment will finance a 1,000-rupee annual match on their contribution. An annual 
interest rate is paid on the combined accumulation; the interest rate is announced 
each year and is equivalent to the rate of return on the formal sector provident 
fund (about 8 percent per year in 2008). This computation has been designed to 
provide a benefit at retirement just above the poverty line. At current interest rates, 
a 30-year-old worker who contributes for 30 years would receive a monthly pen-
sion of about 2,000 rupees at retirement at age 60. The scheme does not allow 
early withdrawals of accumulations. Account holders are provided an annual 
 account statement. Web-based individual accounts are opened for each worker in 
the scheme, and a computer-generated passbook is provided within 30 days, 
which contains a scanned photograph and the enrollment form of the account 
holder. The individual receives a unique identifier at the point of registration, using 
an application called the Social Security Solution (sCube), which allows portability 
of the account and permits the worker to make contributions at any location in the 
state. Using a variety of options, sCube allows online and offline data entry and 
requires only a half day of training to operate. Raising the awareness of members is 
strongly emphasized before and following enrollment, using short films, comics, 
interactive pension calculators, and other approaches.
Source: Invest India Micro Pension Services Pvt., Ltd., http://www.iimp.in.
Issues for the Evolution of the Rural Pension System        123
previously described). Given the likely degree of risk aversion on the part 
of rural workers in China and the country’s underdeveloped regulatory 
framework, offering a guaranteed rate of return, as suggested above, 
seems to be the preferred option for the medium term.
Could the Basic Rural Pension Benefit Evolve 
into a Social Pension?
A key policy question for the future development of the rural pension 
system is whether the basic benefit should in time evolve into a “social 
pension” for which eligibility is not linked to contributions to an indi-
vidual account, as happens now. International experience reviewed 
later in this section suggests that full pension coverage is very difficult 
to achieve at the level of the individual in rural and informal sector 
schemes based on approaches that require contributions, even with 
incentives to contribute.
The objective of a social pension would be to ensure basic subsis-
tence for those elderly who are not covered by existing pension provi-
sions or who are unable to generate adequate retirement income from 
their contributions during their working age. An inability to generate 
adequate retirement income could occur for a variety of reasons, includ-
ing sickness, disability, or time out of the workforce (for child rearing, 
study, and so on). The rationale for a social pension is twofold: (a) to 
provide a low level of support for the growing number of elderly with 
minimal resources to prevent them from falling into poverty in their old 
age, and (b) to reduce incentives for overly high precautionary saving 
before retirement.
A social pension could follow uniform design parameters nationwide, 
although benefits would reflect local characteristics. Provincial authori-
ties would be held accountable for observing the national framework. The 
benefit amount could be set as a percentage of the regional average wage, 
with the objective of exceeding the per capita benefit under the existing 
dibao scheme. A “pension test” could also reduce the benefit by a propor-
tion of the benefits received from other pension arrangements, say for 
those 65 to 74 years of age. The pension test would need to be designed 
to reward those who contributed to other pension schemes while target-
ing those with the least income from all sources, including other pension 
benefits. Given the need to eventually increase the retirement age to 
65 for men and women, setting 65 as the minimum age for both men and 
women to qualify for a social pension seems appropriate. Doing so is 
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important from a labor supply incentive viewpoint, although it would 
need to maintain consistency with urban pension policy. Such a benefit 
would be noncontributory and financed by national, provincial, munici-
pal, and local resources. 
A social pension approach would be broadly consistent with the 
design of the basic benefit provision under the rural pension pilot. As 
noted above, any social pension should be subjected to a pension test, 
which would adjust the amount paid to those 65 to 74 years of age by a 
proportion of benefits they receive either from the individual account or 
from an urban workers’ pension. The adjustment factor could be set as 
high as 50 percent initially (to provide a strong incentive to contribute 
to the individual account), but it should be adjusted on the basis of 
actual experience. A stylized example is provided in figure 6.3, using a 
benefit level linked to rural individual minimum consumption and 
applying a 50 percent adjustment factor.
As with the basic benefit under the national pilot, the value of a 
social pension relative to the dibao threshold in different localities is an 
important design parameter. In this regard, the practice of most current 
rural pension pilot schemes seems appropriate (that is, setting the social 
Figure 6.3 Stylized Example of Rural Pension Benefit Levels and Composition 
under Proposed Scheme
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pension at a level above the dibao per capita threshold). This practice is 
important for incentive reasons, but—for fiscal reasons—the level should 
not be substantially higher. If a social pension were set too high, the 
incentive to contribute to the individual account would be weaker; if it is 
set too low, its poverty alleviation objective may be undermined. Under 
the rural pension pilot, the central government has set the minimum flat 
benefit at RMB 55 monthly while allowing provision of additional funds 
from subnational sources. This minimum flat benefit compares with a 
national average rural dibao threshold of RMB 82 in 2008, with a range 
from a minimum of RMB 26 to RMB 267 (or 11 to 41 percent of the 
national rural average wage). The dibao threshold rates suggest that closer 
attention needs to be paid to the relative level of the social pension floor 
to align protections and incentives appropriately. Finally, pensions from 
current pilot rural pension schemes and any possible future social pen-
sion should not affect the receipt of the allowance for following family 
planning policies. However, some Chinese researchers have proposed 
integrating the programs by using the family planning subsidy as an addi-
tional subsidy toward individual pension contributions (Mi and Yang 
2008; C. Yang 2007; Y. Yang 2007).
Indicative cost estimates suggest that a social pension set around the 
urban income poverty line would be about 0.11 percent of 2010 GDP, 
rising to 0.31 percent of GDP by 2040 (see figure 6.4).10 A social pension 
set around the rural poverty consumption line would be about 0.13 per-
cent of 2010 GDP, declining to about 0.12 percent of GDP by 2040. 
These estimates would vary substantially with the benefit level, the 
growth in the benefit level, the level of urbanization, and the observed 
benefit reductions arising from the pension test. The upward trend in cost 
projections reflects population aging and urbanization. By comparison, if 
the social pension were set at about 28 percent of the urban average wage 
(the OECD average), the cost would be 0.75 percent of GDP in 2010 
and would rise to 2.10 percent of GDP by 2040.11 Although the higher 
figure is probably more than China may wish to allocate to such a ben-
efit, the experience of several OECD countries noted below suggests that 
a benefit level somewhere between the lower bound and the OECD 
average could be affordable.
Countries with all levels of income have widespread experience with 
noncontributory social pensions. The experience with reducing old-age 
poverty is generally positive, although issues of fiscal sustainability have 
arisen in lower-income settings. However, social pensions are proving to 
be an increasingly popular method for bridging the old-age coverage gap 
in pension systems.12 
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OECD countries have different approaches to social pensions (see 
table 6.1).13 Although about half the countries rely on a single approach 
to social pensions, the remainder rely on combinations of three basic 
approaches:
• The basic pension, often called a “demogrant,” is a flat benefit for the 
elderly awarded independently of income. Countries with basic pen-
sions usually have some qualifying provisions, such as residency or con-
tribution tests. 
• A resource-tested social pension is provided either through a separate 
program for the elderly or as part of a general social assistance scheme. 
Eligibility is subject to some form of means testing, which can include 
income or income plus assets. 
• The minimum pension is similar to a resource-tested pension in that it 
targets older people with lower incomes. The key difference is that only 
income from pension schemes is considered when calculating entitle-
ment to a minimum pension. Consequently, someone with substantial 
Figure 6.4 Indicative Cost Projections for Urban and Rural Social Pensions
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income from nonpension sources can still qualify. In countries where a 
contribution history is required to qualify for social pensions, periods of 
unemployment and disability are often counted toward the qualifying 
period. As a result, in practice, most people qualify. 
Among OECD countries, the replacement rate from the social pen-
sion ranges from 20 to 40 percent of average economywide earnings, with 
a cross-country average of just under 30 percent (see figure 6.5). In 
Japan, for example, the rate is as low as 16 percent, whereas in Portugal 
it is well over 40 percent. Comparisons are complicated by the availabil-
ity of general social assistance programs for the elderly. Over the past 
decade, a number of OECD countries have significantly reformed their 
social pension programs although no clear directional trend exists. Some 
countries (such as France, Ireland, the Republic of Korea, and Mexico) 
have introduced (or increased the basis for) minimum pensions. Others 
(such as Germany, Japan, and New Zealand) have cut earnings-related 
pensions with little effect on social pensions. Still others (such as Italy 
and several eastern European countries) have abolished minimum pen-
sions altogether.14
As table 6.2 shows, the most significant difference in design is whether 
noncontributory social pensions are universal, means tested, or categorical 
Table 6.1 Social Pensions in OECD Countries
Country
Resource 
tested Basic Minimum Country
Resource 
tested Basic Minimum
Australia X     Korea, Rep.   X  
Austria X Luxembourg X X 
Belgium X   X Mexico   X X 
Canada X X Netherlands X 
Czech 
Republic 
 
X X New Zealand   X 
 
Denmark X X Norway X X 
Finland     X Poland     X 
France X X Portugal X X 
Germany X     Slovak Republic     X 
Greece X X Spain X X 
Hungary     X Sweden     X 
Iceland X X Switzerland X X 
Ireland X X   Turkey X   X 
Italy X United Kingdom X X X 
Japan   X   United States X    
Source: OECD 2007. 
Figure 6.5 Value of Social Pensions as a Percentage of Average Earnings in OECD Countries
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Table 6.2 Inventory of Noncontributory Pension Programs in Developing Countries
Country Date of recent law Type of program Administration Eligibility age
Argentina 1993 Means test Ministry of Social Development 70
Bangladesh 1998 Means test Ministry of Social Welfare 57
Bolivia 1993 Universal but 
cohort restricted
Ministry of Economic Development 65
Botswana 1996 Universal Department of Labor and Social Security 65
Brazil
(Social Assistance [RMV]/
BPC Rural Pension)
(1974)
1993
1992
Means test
Means test, basic 
contributory record
National Social Security Institute (INSS) 67
60 for men, 
55 for women
Chile 1980 and 1981 Means test Ministry of Development and Planning 70
Costa Rica 1995 Means test Costa Rican Social Insurance Fund 65
India 1995 Means test Ministry of Labor 65
Mauritius 1976 Universal Ministry of Social Security and Solidarity 60
Namibia 1990 Universal Government Pension Fund (GIPF) 60
Nepal 1995–6 Universal Ministry of Local Development 75
Samoa 1990 Universal Labor Department and Accident Compensation Board 65
South Africa 1992 (amended 
in 1997)
Means test National and Provincial Departments of Social 
Development
65 for men, 
60 for women
Sri Lanka 1939 Means test Provincial Department of Social Services
Uruguay 1995 Means test Ministry of Labor and Social Security and Social 
Welfare Fund
70
Source: World Bank staff estimates.
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in coverage. No definitive pattern by level of income emerges in this 
respect. The broad distinction is sometimes drawn between social pension 
systems that are core elements of old-age security and those that are 
supplementary (either to contributory systems or to informal support 
systems). This distinction can be determined by comparing the combina-
tion of coverage rates among the elderly and benefit levels relative to 
country income, as figure 6.6 shows for selected developing countries.
With respect to the age of eligibility, experience also differs, but 65 
to 70 is most common (see table 6.2). The financing source for social 
pensions also varies across countries, although general revenues are 
most common. Brazil, in contrast, funds its social pension scheme from 
a 2 percent contribution from rural employers.
Figure 6.6 Ratio of Social Pension to per Capita Income Multiplied by Ratio of 
Number of Recipients to Number of Elderly
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ratio of social pension to per capita income multiplied
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The effect of social pension schemes in developing countries is gener-
ally positive in alleviating old-age poverty, although evidence is limited. 
Core schemes (found in Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Mauritius, Namibia, 
and South Africa) have been shown to reduce old-age poverty signifi-
cantly, whereas supplementary schemes have varied more widely in 
their targeting and their outcomes in poverty reduction.15 Evidence for 
other effects from social pension schemes is even more limited, coming 
primarily from Bolivia, Brazil, and South Africa. The effects seem to be 
mixed. Positive effects may include permanent increases in income from 
the investment of transfers, better health indicators, and higher school 
enrollment rates for children from pensioner households. Negative 
effects may include a reduction in labor supply on the part of other 
household members. The evidence is mixed on the reduction of family 
support to the elderly. 
Countries have also managed the interaction between social pension 
schemes and defined contribution schemes in different ways. Chile 
serves as an interesting example. In its 2008 reform, Chile introduced a 
new solidarity pension with the twofold objectives of (a) achieving uni-
versal pension coverage and (b) reducing old-age poverty more effec-
tively. The solidarity pension also aims to better integrate the country’s 
contributory system and the noncontributory system. The solidarity 
pension targets men and women over 65 (who are among the poorest 
60 percent of the population) and is subject to a national residence 
requirement. A universal basic pension was established for people with 
no individual account accumulations. Those with a contribution history 
and individual account accumulations, however, are eligible to have 
their funded pension benefit augmented subject to a ceiling on the 
combined amount. As a result, the supplement (known as the “solidarity 
contribution”) shrinks for individuals with higher account balances. The 
withdrawal of the solidarity pension is designed to retain incentives to 
sustain higher contributions to the funded portion of the scheme. 
People with higher income levels are permitted to supplement their 
individual account balances with voluntary contributions. Figure 6.7 
illustrates the scheme in graphical form. From a design viewpoint, the 
system strikes a useful balance between creating incentives to contrib-
ute and providing basic old-age protection for those with low or no 
contribution history (although concerns have been raised with respect 
to its projected fiscal cost).
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The Interaction between Individual Accounts and the Social 
Pension and the Transitional Generation
A key policy decision relates to whether individual accounts and the basic 
benefit (or social pension) should be combined over time as the con-
tributory system matures. The two broad options are (a) to retain a basic 
benefit (or social pension) for people over a certain age to provide an 
income floor that is supplemented by benefits from individual accounts 
(if chosen, a number of questions must be addressed regarding the inter-
action between the basic benefit level and eligibility criteria and the 
contributory pension, as was illustrated in the case of Chile) or (b) to 
gradually phase out the basic benefit (or social pension) as the contribu-
tory system matures, addressing elderly poverty through the regular social 
assistance program (perhaps, as is the case in a number of urban areas 
already, with an elderly supplement on the dibao threshold or benefit 
level). This book recommends retaining the basic benefit (or social pen-
sion) even in the longer run. 
In either case, a targeted benefit level from the combination of the 
basic benefit (or social pension) and individual accounts must be estab-
lished, ideally falling between the poverty line and the average wage. The 
specific target should depend on the fiscal envelope and social policy 
decisions relating to work incentives as people age. The target should be 
indexed over time against prices or per capita incomes (or some combina-
tion of the two). This book recommends basing indexation policies on 
Figure 6.7 Chile’s System of Solidarity Pensions, Introduced in 2008
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Source: Fajnzylber, PowerPoint slide, 2008.
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some mixture of prices and wages, with prices the major factor to meet 
poverty-alleviation objectives.
Policy makers must decide how to handle those approaching retire-
ment who will have insufficient time to contribute enough to their 
accounts to earn a reasonable pension. Special treatment is needed to 
manage this transition. The issue has been dealt with in a variety of ways 
under previous rural pension pilots in China, and a number of schemes 
have special treatment for people older than 45. Baoji, for example, 
allowed those over 45 to receive a full pension if they contributed until 
they reach 60; those over 60 were also entitled, subject to “family bind-
ing.” This approach is the same as that adopted in the rural pension pilot. 
Some schemes have provisions for the lump-sum payment of contribu-
tions by those without a full contribution history; in some cases, at the 
point of retirement (for example, Beijing and Zhuhai) and in others dur-
ing the accumulation phase. Other schemes have older cohorts continue 
to make contributions for up to five years after reaching the normal 
retirement age.
One option for dealing with the transitional generation (defined, for 
example, as people over 50 in the year they start contributing) is to 
notionally credit their accounts with full individual and matched contribu-
tions for all the years in which they did not contribute, assuming a 
standard age of entry into the scheme of somewhere between 20 and 25.
Moving from Rural Pensions to a Residents’ Pension?
Apart from the issues discussed above, a further consideration for a pen-
sion system for rural populations is the future integration of urban and 
rural pension systems and the issue of portability. Although integration is 
unlikely in the foreseeable future, implying full equalization of benefits 
between rural and urban areas (just as the current urban system does not 
provide the same benefits everywhere), a common design framework 
would be useful to facilitate portability between systems. Such a frame-
work can already be seen in several areas, where integrated rural and 
urban residents’ pension schemes are in place (for example, Zhongshan 
in Guangdong Province). In recent years, rural migrant workers have 
tended to stay longer in their destination location, with about two-thirds 
of migrant workers remaining resident for three or more years. This prac-
tice reflects the long-term trend in the labor market toward greater 
urbanization. In such cases, the need to move workers’ pension accumu-
lations and entitlements with them—or “totalize” their benefits between 
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different locations so they can enjoy them from different locations at 
retirement—will become increasingly important. These bigger-picture 
integration issues will quickly become key concerns for the evolving rural 
pension system as it consolidates during the 12th Five-Year Plan period.
Conclusion
The issues outlined in this chapter suggest that some adaptations of the 
national rural pension pilot have the potential to strengthen the system 
over time. They are offered as options the government could consider as 
it expands the current schemes for rural and urban workers. In any case, 
the issues discussed address only the general framework and would need 
elaboration to become operational. However, they may over time help 
strike a reasonable balance among concerns for elderly welfare, fiscal 
demands, and labor market effects. The current rural pension pilot is 
clearly a major step in the right direction and provides a solid foundation 
from which to think about evolution of the rural pension system over the 
coming decade and later. This book has shown a seemingly compelling 
rationale for public intervention in the welfare of the elderly who are not 
already covered by urban pension systems, and the new rural pension 
pilot demonstrates the government’s commitment to achieving its goal of 
universal social security coverage this decade.
Notes
 1. This chapter is an adapted and shortened form of the annex on rural pensions 
in China: A Vision for Pension Policy Reform Options (World Bank forthcom-
ing). That paper covers all elements of the Chinese pension system in a more 
comprehensive manner.
 2. For a comprehensive discussion of recent experiences with “closing the cover-
age gap” through the extension of pension systems to rural and informal sec-
tor populations, see Holzmann, Robalino, and Takayama (2009) and Palacios 
and Robalino (2009) on the framework for matching defined contribution 
schemes.
 3. See (a) Lin (2006) for European, Commonwealth of Independent States, and 
low-income countries; (b) Gong (2006) for Japan; (c) Su (2007) for the 
Republic of Korea; and (d) Leisering, Sen, and Hussain (2002) and Zheng 
(2007) for a general discussion of the subsidy approach.
 4. Localized examples of collectives in urban areas have solid revenue bases 
from the rental of collective land to factories or for other users that may be 
able to provide significant matching, whereas rural collectives may not. 
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 5. See Zheng (2007) regarding a reserve fund proposal. See Lü (2005) for 
proposals for higher-return portfolio options.
 6. Examples of contracting arrangements in other countries offer the benefits of 
competition among asset managers while limiting the number of asset manag-
ers to ensure a critical mass of funds and generate economies of scale in fund 
management (for example, India’s new pension scheme and a number of 
funded pillar schemes in Central Asia, Europe, and Latin America). However, 
most of these countries have more developed regulatory and accountability 
frameworks than China does at present (see Rajkumar and Dorfnum, 2011).
 7. See Holzmann and Palmer (2006) for a comprehensive review of notional 
defined contributions. 
 8. See http://www.cnr.cn/china/gdgg/201009/t20100907_507012375.html, 
accessed October 12, 2011.
 9. This section draws on Palacios and Robalino (2009).
10.  These figures assume a benefit level of 1,200 yuan per year (about 4.1 percent 
of the projected urban average wage) beginning in 2010.
11. For comparison purposes, the reduction resulting from the application of 
the pension test is assumed to be the same in the two scenarios. Realistically, 
the cost reduction in the application of the pension test should be greater 
in the second of the two scenarios because the benefit before the reduction 
is far higher.
12. See Palacios and Sluchynskyy (2006). See also Asher for middle-income 
countries and Barrientos for lower-income countries, both cited in Holzmann, 
Robalino, and Takayama (2009). 
13. See Pearson and Whitehouse (2009) for a discussion of social pensions in 
high-income countries.
14. See Pearson and Whitehouse (2009) for details on the effect of these pension 
reforms on net replacement rates by earning level.
15. See Kakwani and Subbarao (2005) on African schemes, Barrientos (2009) on 
four developing countries, and Palacios and Sluchynsky (2006) for an interna-
tional overview.
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A P P E N D I X
Data Sources for Analysis of 
Rural Elderly Welfare
Data source Years Topics Organizations
China Health and 
Nutrition Survey
(CHNS)
1991
1993
1997
2002
2004
2006
This survey was designed to examine the effects of health, 
nutrition, and family planning policies and programs 
implemented by national and local governments and to see 
how the socioeconomic transformation of Chinese society 
affects the health and nutritional status of its population.
Carolina Population Center at the University 
of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, http://www
.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china, and the 
National Institute of Nutrition and Food 
Safety at the Chinese Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention
Rural Household 
Survey;
Follow-up survey 
conducted in 2004 
Annual 
surveys 
1995–2006
This survey was designed to examine the developmental status 
of the rural economy by collecting longitudinal household 
information on household demography, agricultural 
production, nonagricultural employment, income, and 
expenditures. This book uses two samples—a four-province 
sample from 1995 to 2003 plus the follow-up survey on labor, 
demography, and governance conducted in 2004—to examine 
private transfers and changing labor supply patterns. A more 
recent sample (2003–06) from eight provinces was used in the 
analysis of saving decisions.
Research Center for Rural Economy, Ministry 
of Agriculture
Population Census 1982
1990
2000
The population census collected information on all individuals 
who lived in rural and urban China at the surveyed time. It 
contains information on demographic characteristics, 
employment, and housing.
National Bureau of Statistics
140  
One Percent Population 
Sample Data
2005 This sample is similar to the population census but only 
draws on 1 percent of total population.
National Bureau of Statistics
China Urban and 
Rural Elderly Survey 
(CURES)
2006 This survey was designed to collect information on income 
and expenditure, health, social security, living arrangement, 
and status of urban and rural elderly.
China Research Center on Aging, Ministry of 
Civil Affairs
China Population 
Statistical Yearbook
1991–2006 It contains information on population and employment in 
rural and urban areas.
National Bureau of Statistics
China Population and 
Employment 
Statistical Yearbook 
2007
2008
2009
It contains information on population and employment in 
rural and urban areas.
National Bureau of Statistics
Labor and Social 
Security Yearbook
2001–08 It contains information on social security. Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security
World Population 
Prospects: 2008 Revision
2008 It is a worldwide population projection data source. Population Division of the Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs of the UN 
Secretariat
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